YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT:  EMPLOYEE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED WORKPLACE INJUSTICES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO INSIDER ATTACKS by Reed, Tracey
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2019-03
YOU CANT ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT: 
EMPLOYEE AND ORGANIZATIONAL
RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED WORKPLACE
INJUSTICES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO
INSIDER ATTACKS
Reed, Tracey
Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62286
Copyright is reserved by the copyright owner.








YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT: 
EMPLOYEE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES 
TO PERCEIVED WORKPLACE INJUSTICES AND THEIR 




Co-Advisors: Shelley P. Gallup 
 Kathleen L. Kiernan (contractor) 
 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction 
Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.




3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT:  EMPLOYEE AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED WORKPLACE 
INJUSTICES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO INSIDER ATTACKS
5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Tracey Reed
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)











11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
 Insider threats are a wicked problem. This thesis investigates three questions: how do employees 
respond to perceived workplace injustice, what is the relationship between employee responses to perceived 
workplace injustices and insider attacks, and how can organizations prevent disgruntled employees from 
committing attacks? These questions were answered using a thorough literature review and case studies. 
Employees respond in one, or a combination, of four ways: exit, loyalty, voice, and counterproductive 
work behaviors, as illustrated by the researcher’s grievance response model. The researcher was unable to 
identify specific employee responses that led to attacks due to a lack of data and multiple, contradictory, 
and missing narratives. Organizations may be able to prevent employees from committing attacks by 
applying the grievance response model, ensuring grievance procedures are consistent and 
transparent, and offering alternative dispute resolution programs. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS
insider threat, insider attack, justice theories, organizational justice, grievances, alternative 




















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
ii 
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
YOU CAN’T ALWAYS GET WHAT YOU WANT: 
EMPLOYEE AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO PERCEIVED 
WORKPLACE INJUSTICES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP 
TO INSIDER ATTACKS 
Tracey Reed 
Captain II, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department 
BS, University of Mary Washington, 2002 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES  
(HOMELAND SECURITY AND DEFENSE) 
from the 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2019 
Approved by: Shelley P. Gallup 
 Co-Advisor 
 Kathleen L. Kiernan 
 Co-Advisor 
 Erik J. Dahl 
 Associate Chair for Instruction 
 Department of National Security Affairs 
iii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
iv 
ABSTRACT 
Insider threats are a wicked problem. This thesis investigates three questions: how 
do employees respond to perceived workplace injustice, what is the relationship between 
employee responses to perceived workplace injustices and insider attacks, and how can 
organizations prevent disgruntled employees from committing attacks? These questions 
were answered using a thorough literature review and case studies. Employees respond in 
one, or a combination, of four ways: exit, loyalty, voice, and counterproductive 
work behaviors, as illustrated by the researcher’s grievance response model. The 
researcher was unable to identify specific employee responses that led to attacks due to a 
lack of data and multiple, contradictory, and missing narratives. Organizations may be 
able to prevent employees from committing attacks by applying the grievance response 
model, ensuring grievance procedures are consistent and transparent, and offering 
alternative dispute resolution programs. 
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Insider threats are a wicked problem because of the definition of an insider and the 
varied threats such insiders pose. Insiders are people with increased access, knowledge, 
and trust due to their relationship with an organization. They can be current or former 
employees, contractors, volunteers, or another affiliate of the organization. There are three 
types of insider threats: violent, non-violent, and unintentional. Violent threats consist of 
workplace violence and insider terrorism (a specific type of workplace violence). Non-
violent threats include, but are not limited to, sabotage, espionage, intellectual property 
(IP) theft, and fraud. Unintentional threats are insiders who, without malicious intent, fail 
to follow security practices due to carelessness or ignorance. 
Violent and non-violent insider threats often begin with a precipitating workplace 
event that the employee perceives as unjust. Employee perceptions are influenced by 
personal, situational, and organizational factors. This thesis answers three questions:  
• How do employees respond to perceived workplace injustices?  
• What is the relationship between employee responses to perceived 
workplace injustices and insider attacks?  
• How can organizations prevent disgruntled employees from committing 
attacks? 
How do employees respond to perceived workplace injustices? Based on a thorough 
literature review, the author created/derived a grievance response model. The model 
indicates that employees respond in one (or a combination) of four ways. The employee 
may choose to voluntarily leave the situation (exit), do nothing and remain loyal, voice 
their complaints using organizational process, or engage in counterproductive work 
behaviors.  
What is the relationship between employee responses to perceived workplace 
injustices and insider attacks? To answer this question, the researcher analyzed violent and 
non-violent case studies. The violent cases include original research on 87 type III 
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workplace violence (employee on employee) attacks and three insider terrorism attacks. 
This original research is compared to a study by Seungmug Lee and Robert McCrie, which 
had similar results. The non-violent case analysis is derived from four research papers with 
case studies on insider attacks. The case studies involved sabotage, IP theft, and fraud in 
the United States. For both the violent and non-violent case studies, the researcher 
attempted to collect the following data points: employment status at the time of the attack; 
time span between employment and the attack; whether the insider survived the attack; the 
reason for the grievance; the target of the attack; and whether there was a history of 
psychiatric issues, intellectual disabilities, and criminal convictions. Due to a lack of data 
and multiple, contradictory, and missing narratives, the researcher could not identify 
specific responses.  
How can organizations prevent disgruntled employees from committing attacks? 
Organizations can use the descriptive, not predictive, grievance response model. The model 
may be used as a guide for organizations to identify what options their employees may be 
more likely to use. The feasibility of the exit, loyalty, voice, and counterproductive work 
behaviors (ELVC) options will differ by organization and employee. Organizations should 
be aware of this and encourage employees to use grievance response options and conflict 
management styles that result in positive outcomes for both the insider and the 
organization, such as voice as opposed to counterproductive work behaviors (CWB). 
Organizations should consider the following questions: 
• Is exit a viable option for employees experiencing a perceived injustice?  
• Can employees easily exit and maintain a similar status, pay, 
retirement, and benefits package?  
• Is loyalty rewarded?  
• Are systems in place for employees to voice grievances?  
• How many are there?  
xvii 
• How well known are they to supervisors and employees? How 
accessible are they?  
• Is there an option to involve a neutral third party?  
• Are there perceived repercussions for voicing grievances?  
• Are CWBs tolerated?  
Organizations should ensure grievance procedures are consistent and transparent to 
all employees. An alternative to grievance systems is the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) program. ADR provides neutral third parties for dispute management, collaborative 
and respectful techniques to address conflicts, and a safe and confidential environment. 
There are three main recommendations derived from this research. Organizations 
should be aware of the exit, loyalty, voice, and CWB theory as well as positive and negative 
influences on specific responses to perceived workplace injustices. Organizations should 
apply ELVC theory to identify how employees are more likely to respond. Organizations 
should take actions to guide employees toward positive responses and hold them 
accountable for negative responses; however, organizations should not hold onto poorly 
performing employees, and employees should not stay in environments they perceive to be 
unjust if loyalty and voice do not work. Supervisors should talk to employees about how 
conflict affects them, their perceived options, and the repercussions or potential outcome 
of each option. 
Organizations should immediately revoke physical and cyber access for all 
employees when they separate voluntarily or involuntarily. Organizations should not 
ignore employees who perceive they are victims of workplace injustice. These employees 
should be a starting point for insider threat monitoring. Supervisors and co-workers should 
recognize and report CWBs. Employees engaging in CWBs should be held accountable. 
Organizations can prevent disgruntled employees from committing attacks by 
understanding: why employees become disgruntled (organizational justice and variations 
of equity theory), how they respond (ELVC theory and conflict management styles), the 
types of threats they pose, and influential individual and organizational factors.  
xviii 
Organizations should educate and train employees and supervisors and change or 
create policies, procedures, and cultures that incorporate these recommendations. ADR 
systems should be credible, allow for employee input, be well-publicized, and involve 
neutral third parties. People have varying conflict management styles; therefore, having 
various grievance methods available increases the probability employees will use and 
perceive the voice response as fair. Organizations must recognize their influence on 
employee responses to perceived workplace injustices and ability to prevent insider attacks. 
These recommendations may prevent not only future attacks but also improve employee 
relationships within their organizations. 
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Insider threats are a wicked problem for organizations due to several factors: not all 
information is available before or after an attack; there are no established standards for 
handling threats or immediate solutions; consequences are high, and the threat never ends. 
The root and proximal causes of insider threats are unique, can be symptoms of other 
issues, and can be explained in various ways.1 For example, a disgruntled employee 
(insider) misbehaves in response to a perceived workplace injustice. Disciplining the 
employee for the behavior may cause him to become more disgruntled and trigger him to 
commit an attack. Not disciplining the employee may give him a sense of being above 
reprimand, thus encouraging inappropriate and potentially escalating behaviors leading 
him on a critical path toward an attack.2 This complex dilemma should not dissuade 
researchers and organizations from seeking opportunities for intervention instead of 
perfecting solutions. 
The insider threat process begins with a combination of individual factors and a 
precipitating event (or accumulation of events). Employees have expectations related to 
the event. If the organization meets the employee’s expectations, the employee is satisfied. 
If not, the employee becomes disgruntled due to a perceived workplace injustice. Perceived 
workplace injustices are a common cause of employee disgruntlement as well as a 
motivation for insider attacks.3 Most disgruntled insiders display counterproductive work 
behaviors (CWB) before attacks; however, co-workers may not have recognized the 
                                                 
1 Robert F. Mills et al., “A Scenario-Based Approach to Mitigating the Insider Threat,” Information 
Systems Security Association 9, no. 4 (May 2011): 12; Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, 
“Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, no. 2 (June 1973): 155-69, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730. 
2 Eric Shaw and Laura Sellers, “Application of the Critical-Path Method to Evaluate Insider Risks,” 
Studies in Intelligence 59, no. 2 (2015): 2, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-59-no-2/pdfs/Shaw-Critical%20Path-June-2015.pdf. 
3 Eric Shaw, Lynn Fischer, and Andree Rose, Insider Risk Evaluation and Audit (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, Defense Personnel Security Research Center, August 2009), 35, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=27453; Stephen G. White, “Workplace Targeted Violence,” in 
International Handbook of Threat Assessment, ed. J. Reid Meloy and Jens Hoffman (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 84. 
2 
behaviors as warning signs. Not all disgruntled insiders who display CWBs will commit 
attacks, that is, pose a threat.  
Insider threat research tends to concentrate on technical and behavioral CWBs 
(precursors). The Management and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat (MERIT) model 
illustrates this process (Figure 1). This thesis explores the opportunity for earlier 
intervention in the time between disgruntlement and the display of CWBs, as noted in the 
circle. 
 
Figure 1. MERIT First Steps4 
                                                 
4 Adapted from Dawn M. Cappelli et al., Management and Education of the Risk of Insider Threat 
(MERIT): Mitigating the Risk of Sabotage to Employers’ Information, Systems, or Networks, Report No. 
CMU/SEI-2006-TN-041 (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, March 2007), 45, www.dtic.mil/get-
tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA468801. 
3 
This research studies insider threats from the perspective of the employee and the 
organization. In doing so, it answers three questions:  
1. How do employees respond to perceived workplace injustices? 
2. What is the relationship between employee responses to perceived 
workplace injustices and insider attacks? 
3. How can organizations prevent disgruntled employees from committing 
attacks?  
Answering these questions has benefits beyond the insider threat field. The findings 
broadly apply to the role of organizations in mitigating perceived workplace injustices and 
increasing satisfaction with the organization.  
Insider threats are a multi-disciplinary problem; therefore, research from a variety 
of fields is analyzed in the literature review. The literature review includes the definition 
of insider threat and a discussion of the three threat types. Next, theories on responses to 
dissatisfaction, organizational justice, equity, social exchange (peer-to-peer relationships), 
agency, and leader-member exchange (supervisor and employee relationships) are 
discussed. Then, CWBs (counterproductive work behaviors) and contributing individual 
and organizational factors are analyzed. Grievances and conflict management styles are 
explored in the final two sections. A comprehensive psychological and sociological 
understanding of insider responses to perceived workplace injustices, analyzing these 
responses as motivations for insider attacks, and the role of the organization in handling 
insider perceived workplace injustices are provided in this diverse literature review. 
A. INSIDER THREAT TYPES 
The term insider has a generally agreed-upon definition with minor variations. This 
thesis defines an insider as a person with increased access, knowledge, and trust because 
of their relationship with an organization. The person can be a current or former employee, 
4 
contractor, volunteer, or another affiliate of the organization.5 Some researchers do not 
consider former employees to be insiders, particularly those who leave voluntarily. Former 
employees often retain knowledge, access, and trust while not drawing attention to 
themselves as threats. A broad definition of an insider is needed to reduce organizational 
vulnerabilities. Organizations cannot adequately defend against threats they do not 
acknowledge. 
There are three types of insider threats: violent, non-violent, and unintentional. 
Violent threats consist of workplace violence and insider terrorism (a specific type of 
workplace violence). Non-violent threats include, but are not limited to, sabotage, 
espionage, intellectual property (IP) theft, and fraud.6 Unintentional threats are insiders 
with no malicious intent who fail to follow security practices due to carelessness or 
ignorance.7 Their actions “cause harm or substantially increase the probability of future 
serious harm to the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s 
information or information systems.”8 Unawareness or laziness toward security practices 
creates unintentional threats. Unintentional threat mitigation consists of training and 
technical solutions. This thesis studies violent and non-violent threats because they are 
intentional acts committed by insiders in response to perceived workplace injustices. 
Insider threat literature does not dispute the types of threats; however, it rarely 
mentions violent threats. Researchers tend to focus on non-violent threats, failing to use a 
                                                 
5 CERT Insider Threat Group, Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats,” 5th ed.  
(Hanscom AFB, MA: Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon University, December 2016), 
https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/TechnicalReport/2016_005_001_484758.pdf; Denise Bulling et 
al., Behavioral Science Guidelines for Assessing Insider Threats (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska, 
July 2008), https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=
publicpolicypublications; National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, Combating the 
Insider Threat (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, May 2, 2014), https://www.us-
cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Combating%20the%20Insider%20Threat_0.pdf. 
6 CERT Insider Threat Group, 3; Denise Bulling et al., “Behavioral Science Guidelines for Assessing 
Insider Threats,” 3; National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, Combating the 
Insider Threat, 1; Frank L. Greitzer et al., “Identifying At-Risk Employees: Modeling Psychosocial 
Precursors of Potential Insider Threats,” (paper presented at the 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference 
on System Sciences, Maui, HI, January 2012), 2392, https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2012.309. 
7 Insider Threat Integrated Process Team, DoD Insider Threat Mitigation (Falls Church, VA: United 
States Department of Defense, 2000), www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA391380, 6. 
8 CERT Insider Threat Group, Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 3. 
5 
holistic approach to the potential detriment of organizations and future research.9 For 
example, in the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats series, the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) Insider Threat Group only addresses non-violent and 
unintentional threats. In the first four editions, it does not address violent insider threats at 
all. In the fifth edition of the series, CERT attributes its lack of workplace violence 
recommendations to a lack of experience and research. CERT plans to include workplace 
violence in its next edition; however, there is no mention of including insider terrorism.10 
Comprehensive insider threat mitigation recommendations should address all threat types 
and their subsets.  
B. THE EVOLUTION OF EXIT, LOYALTY, VOICE, AND NEGLECT 
THEORIES 
Exit, loyalty, and voice theory was proposed by Albert Hirschman in 1970 to 
describe employee responses to low job satisfaction, and it begins to identify potential 
employee responses to perceived workplace injustices. These responses can alert 
management to organizational failures. Exit is voluntarily leaving a position or 
organization. Voice is “any attempt at all to change rather than to escape from an 
objectionable state of affairs.”11 Employees use voice by telling someone within the 
organization about their dissatisfaction. Loyalty is choosing to “suffer in silence, confident 
that things will soon get better.”12 Exit, voice, and loyalty are all appropriate responses to 
employee disgruntlement; however, Hirschman failed to account for the potential deviant 
nature of dissatisfied employees. 
Hagedoorn et al. divided voice into two categories: considerate and aggressive. 
Considerate voice takes into account the needs of the employee and the organization. 
                                                 
9 Mills et al., “A Scenario-Based Approach to Mitigating the Insider Threat,” 12. 
10 CERT Insider Threat Group, Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats, 4. 
11 Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and 
States (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 30. 
12 Hirschman, 38. 
6 
Aggressive voice considers only the needs of the employee.13 Employees who liked their 
job and supervisors used considerate voice and loyalty. Employees who disliked their job 
or supervisors used aggressive voice, exit, and neglect. Employees who thought of 
supervisors as approachable and responsive felt a higher sense of justice and the possibility 
of improvement.14 The aggressive voice begins to acknowledge the deviant nature of 
dissatisfied employees but only accounts for their words and not their actions.  
Dan Farrell used studies of dissatisfaction among customers and people in romantic 
relationships to expand on Hirschman’s theory by creating exit, loyalty, voice, and neglect 
(ELVN) theory. Farrell defined neglect as “lax and disregardful behavior among 
workers.”15 Examples of neglect include lateness, absenteeism, and increased error 
rates.16 Neglect recognizes passive deviant actions; it still does not account for insider 
threats who actively seek to harm people and organizations.  
Farrell conducted two studies on the relationship between ELVN, job satisfaction, 
organizational investment (commitment), and the availability of better alternatives (better 
job offers or retirement). Employees who were highly satisfied and invested in their jobs 
chose voice and loyalty. Employees with low job satisfaction and low investment exited or 
neglected their positions. Employees chose exit or voice when they had better 
alternatives.17 Influential factors, such as commitment and the availability of better 
alternatives, help researchers understand why employees may choose one response over 
another. Organizations can use this knowledge to guide employees to respond in ways that 
are most beneficial to both parties. 
                                                 
13 Mariët Hagedoorn et al., “Employees’ Reactions to Problematic Events: A Circumplex Structure of 
Five Categories of Responses, and the Role of Job Satisfaction,” Journal of Organizational Behavior 20, 
no. 3 (May 1999): 319, https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1379(199905)20:3<309::AID-
JOB895>3.0.CO;2-P. 
14 Hagedoorn et al, 320. 
15 Dan Farrell, “Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect as Responses to Job Dissatisfaction: A 
Multidimensional Scaling Study,” Academy of Management Journal 26, no. 4 (December 1, 1983): 598, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/255909. 
16 Farrell, 598. 
17 Caryl E. Rusbult et al., “Impact of Exchange Variables on Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect: An 
Integrative Model of Responses to Declining Job Satisfaction,” Academy of Management Journal 31, no. 3 
(September 1988): 615-616, https://doi.org/10.2307/256461. 
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Michael Withey and William Cooper attempted to predict ELVN responses using 
six factors. Like Farrell, they looked at prior job satisfaction, organizational investment, 
and the availability of better alternatives. Additionally, they examined the cost 
(repercussions) of exit and voice, belief improvement was possible, and the locus of control 
(Figure 2).18 Low job satisfaction and low investment have a push-and-pull effect on exit; 
low job satisfaction and low investment push employees away, while better alternatives 
pull them away. They found that the perceived effectiveness of voice depends on whether 
the employee feels the supervisor or organization will take corrective or retaliatory action 
and whether they think someone else will speak up.19 Employees who believed they had 
control chose loyalty and voice; those who did not chose exit and neglect. Farrell, Withey, 
and Cooper all found prior job satisfaction and investment led to a high likelihood of voice 
and better alternatives led to exit. Most of their predictions proved accurate but had varying 
degrees of reliability.  
                                                 
18 Michael J. Withey and William H. Cooper, “Predicting Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 34, no. 4 (December 1989): 533-536, https://doi.org/10.2307/2393565. 
19 Withey and Cooper, 532-536. 
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Figure 2. Exit, Loyalty, Voice, and Neglect Results from Graduate Student 
Study20 
  
                                                 
20 Adapted from Withey and Cooper, 525, 530-532. 
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Two explanations account for the unreliable results. First, employees can use 
multiple responses at the same time and change responses over time. Second, the definition 
of loyalty was not the same for researchers and participants. The researchers saw loyalty 
as active support of the organization, while some participants saw it as passive. The 
researchers considered loyalty a default action; if an employee does not use the other three 
responses, then they remain loyal by default. The statistical unreliability of the results does 
not mean the research lacks applicability. Although these six factors cannot accurately 
predict response, they influence responses to varying degrees depending on the employee 
and their situation.  
Although ELVN theory does not account for employees who actively attack co-
workers and organizations, it does provide a basis for identifying employees’ responses to 
perceived injustices. The exclusion of active attacks may be an oversight of the researchers 
regarding the questions they asked or a response bias. Hirschman, Hagedorn, Farrell, 
Withey, and Cooper did not conduct case studies of dissatisfied employees; they conducted 
surveys on various groups of people. Participants may not think or admit they would 
commit insider attacks; however, they may react differently when they are in the situation. 
Although Withey and Cooper’s study did not support their predictions statistically, 
organizations should consider prior job satisfaction, organizational investment, the 
availability of better alternatives, the cost (repercussions) of exit, the cost of voice, belief 
improvement was possible, and the locus of control as potential influences on employee 
response.  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE THEORIES 
After identifying how employees respond to perceived workplace injustices and 
factors that influence those responses, this research reviews how employees perceive 
fairness or organizational justice. Withey and Cooper noted an employee’s perception of 
organizational justice influences whether they believe improvement is possible using 
voice. Employees can form perceptions about justice within their organization without any 
10 
personal experience but, instead, based solely on the experiences of co-workers.21 They 
may become convinced that voice will not work without trying themselves and resort to 
other options. Organizational justice perceptions have direct and indirect influences on how 
employees choose to respond to perceived injustices.  
One of the central debates surrounding organizational justice theories are the 
number of justice domains; proposed models use one to four factors. The two agreed-upon 
factors are distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice theory studies an 
employee’s thoughts, emotions, and behaviors for particular outcomes. Procedural justice 
theory focuses on the perceived fairness of the process that influences an employee’s 
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors toward the organization. The third factor, interactional 
justice, focuses on the interpersonal treatment of people during justice (grievance) process. 
The four-factor model divides interactional justice into two types: interpersonal justice (the 
treatment people receive) and informational justice (the explanations people receive about 
the process and how outcomes were determined).22 Some researchers consider 
interactional justice the “social side of procedural justice” and not a separate factor.23 A 
meta-analysis conducted by Jason Colquitt et al. found strong correlations between 
interpersonal and informational justice, but they were not strong enough to combine the 
two theories.24 This thesis uses the most widely accepted three-factor model: distributive, 
procedural, and interactional. 
Distributive, procedural, and interactional justice are interdependent to varying 
degrees. Joel Brockner uses psychological strain to explain how interactional justice relates 
to distributive justice in his book, A Contemporary Look at Organization Justice, he. A 
                                                 
21 Withey and Cooper, 534-535. 
22 Jason A. Colquitt et al., “Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25 Years of 
Organizational Justice Research.,” Journal of Applied Psychology 86, no. 3 (June 2001): 425-427, 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.3.425; Yochi Cohen-Charash and Paul E. Spector, “The Role of 
Justice in Organizations: A Meta-Analysis,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 86, 
no. 2 (November 2001): 278-279, https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2001.2958;  
23 Maureen L Ambrose, Mark A Seabright, and Marshall Schminke, “Sabotage in the Workplace: The 
Role of Organizational Injustice,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 89, no. 1 
(September 2002): 950, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0749-5978(02)00037-7. 
24 Colquitt et al., “Justice at the Millennium,” 435. 
11 
psychological strain occurs when a person perceives a threat is high (adverse outcome, 
distributive justice) and the resources to manage the threat (control) are low.25 The 
information and emotional support an employee receives from supervisors and the 
organization increases their perception of control over a perceived threat.26 Their 
psychological strain is lessened, and they feel they have control, which influences their 
response toward loyalty or voice as described by Withey and Cooper.27 Brockner also 
believes there is an interactive relationship between outcome favorability (distributive 
justice) and process fairness (procedural justice).28 He states that once organizations 
achieve average outcome favorability, they should focus on process fairness to increase the 
employee’s support for the decision, the people making the decision, and the 
organization.29 Organizations should be cognizant of conditions that cause employees high 
psychological strain and seize on opportunities to increase fairness perceptions. 
Researchers have difficulty determining which aspect of organizational justice has 
the most significant impact on fairness perceptions. In 1976, Gerald Leventhal proposed 
six procedural criteria justice systems have to be considered fair: consistency, freedom 
from bias, accuracy, the ability for decisions to be corrected, representation by various 
groups, and conformity to ethical standards.30 Colquitt et al. found that Leventhal’s criteria 
had a strong relationship to perceptions of procedural fairness. After they controlled 
outcomes, the most influential contributors to perceived fairness were interactional justice 
and Leventhal’s criteria.31 Employees who achieve the outcomes they desire (distributive 
justice) may still be disgruntled if they feel the process was unfair or people mistreated 
                                                 
25 Joel Brockner, A Contemporary Look at Organizational Justice (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
26 Brockner, 31. 
27 Withey and Cooper, “Predicting Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect,” 533. 
28 Brockner, A Contemporary Look at Organizational Justice, 10. 
29 Brockner, 11. 
30 Gerald S. Leventhal, What Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of 
Fairness in Social Relationships (Alexandria, VA: National Science Foundation, September 1976), 24, 
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED142463.pdf. 
31 Colquitt et al., “Justice at the Millennium,” 435. 
12 
them. They (and other employees) may feel a fair outcome is not guaranteed in the future 
due to unfair processes.  
Organizational justice provides a framework for understanding how employees 
perceive fairness. Employees are not concerned solely with the outcome of a grievance but 
also with the fairness of the process and how people treated them. Allowing an employee 
to maintain a feeling of control and offering support reduces psychological strain 
associated with grievances. 
This chapter began with an introduction explaining the complexity of insider 
threats.  A comprehensive approach to defining who is an insider and the types of threats 
they pose is outlined in this thesis. Neglecting threats make organizations and employees 
vulnerable to attack and employees become threats due to perceived workplace injustices. 
As a result, they respond using exit, loyalty, voice, and neglect. Organizations must 




II. PERCEIVED WORKPLACE INJUSTICES AND INSIDER 
ATTACKS 
A. COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIORS 
CWBs are a means for employees to restore equity. When an employee perceives 
injustice, they negatively adjusts their behavior to match the inequity they feels from the 
organization or supervisor.32 CWBs include, but are not limited to, employee theft, fraud, 
workplace sabotage, workplace aggression, interpersonal conflict, antisocial behavior, 
withdrawal, cyber deviance, revenge, retaliation, harassment, and bullying.33 Paul Spector 
et al. combine 45 behaviors from the Counterproductive Work Behavior Checklist into five 
categories: sabotage, withdrawal, production deviance, abuse, and theft.34 Melissa Gruys 
and Paul Sackett use 11 behaviors: theft and related behavior, misuse of information, 
destruction of property, poor quality work, misuse of time and resources, unsafe behavior, 
poor attendance, alcohol use, drug use, inappropriate verbal actions, and inappropriate 
physical actions.35 CWBs can be acts of omission (neglect) or commission (attacks).  
Research indicates strong connections between perceived organizational injustice 
and CWBs. Oge Monanu, Ifeanyi Okoli, and Charles Gozietheir found a “significant and 
                                                 
32 Cohen-Charash and Spector, “The Role of Justice in Organizations,” 287-288; Suzy Fox, Paul E. 
Spector, and Don Miles, “Counterproductive Work Behavior (CWB) in Response to Job Stressors and 
Organizational Justice: Some Mediator and Moderator Tests for Autonomy and Emotions,” Journal of 
Vocational Behavior 59, no. 3 (December 2001): 302, https://doi.org/10.1006/jvbe.2001.1803. 
33 Fox, Spector, and Miles, 292; Adrian Furnham and Evelyn M. Siegel. “Reactions to Organizational 
Injustice: Counter Work Behaviors and the Insider Threat.” In Justice and Conflicts, eds. Elisabeth Kals 
and Jürgen Maes, 201-204 (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer), 2011, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-19035-
3_12; Lily Chernyak-Hai and Aharon Tziner, “Relationships Between Counterproductive Work Behavior, 
Perceived Justice and Climate, Occupational Status, and Leader-Member Exchange,” Journal of Work and 
Organizational Psychology 30, no. 1 (April 2014): 1, https://doi.org/10.5093/tr2014a1.  
34 Paul E. Spector et al., “The Dimensionality of Counterproductivity: Are All Counterproductive 
Behaviors Equal?” Journal of Vocational Behavior 68, no. 3 (June 2006): 446-60. 
35 Melissa L. Gruys and Paul R. Sackett, “Investigating the Dimensionality of Counterproductive 
Work Behavior,” International Journal of Selection and Assessment 11, no. 1 (2003): 30, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2389.00224. 
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positive relationship” between organizational injustice and CWBs.36 Yochi Cohen-
Charash and Paul Spector found that CWBs are closely related to low procedural justice 
and more loosely related to distributive and interactional injustice.37 Rebecca Bennett and 
Sandra Robinson agree that interpersonal and organizational deviance are related to low 
procedural and interactional justice. They found neither type of deviance to be related to 
distributive justice.38 Lily Chernyak-Hai and Aharon Tziner found high levels of perceived 
distributive justice, a favorable organizational climate, and strong leader-member 
exchange (LMX) lead to fewer CWBs because a strong LMX acts as a buffer to perceived 
low distributive justice.39 Although there is some disagreement in the literature, a majority 
of researchers believe CWBs are a result of all three perceived injustices to varying extents. 
Karl Aquino et al. studied the relationship between blame and revenge. Revenge is 
“an action in response to some perceived harm or wrongdoing by another party that is 
intended to inflict damage, injury, discomfort, or punishment on the party judged 
responsible.”40 According to their study, the willingness to seek revenge depends on both 
the relative and absolute positions of power of the employees. Employees use revenge 
against co-workers with less power. People in positions of lesser power depend on those 
with more power and, therefore, are less likely to seek revenge for perceived workplace 
injustices. People in higher-ranking positions were less likely to seek revenge because of 
the “normative constraints associated with positions of authority and power.”41 Revenge 
is a motivation for employees to restore justice in an organization. Employees in positions 
                                                 
36 Ifeanyi E. Okoli, Oge G. Monanu, and Gozie Adibe, “Examining the Link between Organizational 
Justice and Counterproductive Work Behaviour,” Journal of Business 1, no. 2 (September 22, 2015): 9, 
http://advancejournals.org/Journal-of-Business-and-Management-Studies/article/examining-the-link-
between-organizational-justice-and-counterproductive-work-behaviour/. 
37 Cohen-Charash and Spector, “The Role of Justice in Organizations,” 308-309. 
38 Rebecca J. Bennett and Sandra L. Robinson, “Development of a Measure of Workplace Deviance,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology 85, no. 3 (2000): 356, https://doi.org/10.I037//0021-9010.85.3.349. 
39 Chernyak-Hai and Tziner, “Relationships between Counterproductive Work Behavior,” 6. 
40 Karl Aquino, Thomas M. Tripp, and Robert J. Bies, “How Employees Respond to Personal Offense: 
The Effects of Blame Attribution, Victim Status, and Offender Status on Revenge and Reconciliation in the 
Workplace,” Journal of Applied Psychology 86, no. 1 (2001): 53, https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-
9010.86.1.52. 
41 Aquino, Tripp, and Bies, 57-58. 
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of lower power may feel mistreated to the point where they no longer care about their career 
and seek revenge against, or attack, those in higher positions.  
In a similar study, Daniel Skarlicki and Robert Folger found retaliation against an 
organization or person within an organization is closely related to distributive, procedural, 
and interactional justice. If procedural and interactional justice are perceived as low, the 
relationship between the outcome and retaliation is strong. A grievance process perceived 
as fair outweighs the effects of an unfavorable outcome and negative interactions. They 
also found that the relationship between distributive and procedural justice is not important 
as long as there is a perceived high level of interactional justice. Procedural and 
interactional justice equally influenced perceived fairness and retaliation.42 The results 
were slightly contradictory. When treated well, employees are willing to overlook 
outcomes and processes. When the process was fair, they were less concerned about 
outcomes and interactions. In both cases, the outcome was the least influential factor in 
preventing retaliation. As discussed in the section on organizational justice, this is why 
insiders are still a threat even when they get what they want.  
B. VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT TYPES OF ATTACKS 
This thesis analyzes case studies involving workplace violence and insider 
terrorism as forms of violent attacks and sabotage, IP theft, and fraud as forms of non-
violent attacks. This section defines these attack types, how they relate to organizational 
justice, and observations about the insiders who committed the attacks. Many researchers, 
organizations, security professionals, and the media refer to the demographic profiles of 
people who commit workplace violence. Demographic profiling is dangerous because it 
can target specific people and ignore others who may pose a threat. Organizational 
demographics skew attacker demographics. An insider threat that works in an organization 
consisting of mainly older white men is most likely to be an older white male. This profile 
                                                 
42 Daniel P. Skarlicki and Robert Folger, “Retaliation in the Workplace: The Roles of Distributive, 
Procedural, and Interactional Justice,” Journal of Applied Psychology 82, no. 3 (June 1997): 438, 
https://search-proquest-com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/614322762/fulltextPDF/C2562927A6D2497CPQ/
1?accountid=12702; Harry Levinson, “Reciprocation: The Relationship between Man and Organization,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 9, no. 4 (March 1965): 370-390, https://doi.org/10.2307/2391032. 
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is not useful to an organization that employs mostly young female minorities. The thesis 
studies characteristics that make an employee a threat; characteristics such as motivations, 
behaviors, and a lack of other response options rather than demographics such as age, 
gender, and race. 
1. Workplace Violence 
Workplace violence is the most common violent insider threat. Workplace violence 
encompasses a broad range of intentional behaviors that affect the organization and may 
result in physical injury or death.43 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
divides workplace violence into four types based on the perpetrator’s relationship with the 
organization or employee (Figure 3). In all types, the victim is an employee. Type I is 
violence perpetrated during the commission of a crime such as a robbery. Type II is 
violence committed by a customer or client. Type III is violence committed by an 
employee. Type IV is violence perpetrated by someone who has a personal relationship 
with an employee but who is unrelated to the workplace, such as a domestic partner, family 
member, or acquaintance.44 This thesis only addresses type III workplace violence.  
                                                 
43 American Society for Industrial Security, ed., Workplace Violence Prevention and Response 
Guidelines (Alexandria, VA: ASIS International, 2005), http://www.ndsc.org/
SiteDocuments/Active%20Shooter/WPVguidlelinesASIS.pdf. 
44 Critical Incident Response Group, Workplace Violence: Issues in Response, ed. Eugene A. Rugala 
and Arnold R. Isaacs (Quantico, VA: Department of Justice, 2003), 13, https://www.fbi.gov/file-
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Figure 3. Occupational Safety and Health Administration Workplace Violence 
Typology45 
Type III workplace violence is a severe form of workplace aggression. Workplace 
aggression includes violent acts and behaviors such as spreading negative rumors, 
purposefully withholding needed information, or intentionally failing to return phone 
                                                 
45 Adapted from National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 4; “Workplace Homicides by 
Selected Characteristics,” United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (accessed January 
13, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/workplace-homicide.xlsx. 
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calls.46 Aggression is “any behavior where the aggressor delivers a noxious stimulus to 
another person—with the intent of harming the other person—and expects that this noxious 
stimulus will harm the targeted victim.” Violence is “an act carried out with the intention, 
or perceived intention, of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”47 The 
difference between aggression and violence is the infliction of physical harm.  
Liane Greenberg and Julian Barling found low procedural justice and employee 
monitoring caused aggression between employees and supervisors but not between 
coworkers. Alcohol use and a history of aggression influence aggression between co-
workers. Aggression toward subordinates was not predictable.48 Employees perceive 
monitoring as a violation of trust, a negative LMX, and low-perceived organizational 
support. They blame supervisors for organizational processes and employee monitoring 
(lack of trust). These findings substantiate the procedural and interactive role of 
supervisors.  
Seungmug Lee and Robert McCrie conducted a study of mass workplace homicides 
committed by insiders. Co-workers described 65.9% of the offenders as either aggressive 
or extremely quiet, 36.4% had job performance issues, 43.2% made threats before the 
attack, 15.9% had a violent criminal record, 20.5% had a history of psychiatric treatment, 
and 6.8% had a history of drug use.49 These are common data points researchers collect 
because they are common assumptions about attackers. Lee and McCrie posit,  
disgruntled employees may commit violent acts not because of any inherent 
personality disorder, but rather because of something related to their 
occupational circumstances. If researchers thoroughly examined offenders 
job performance, it could help lead to a better understanding of workplace 
                                                 
46 I. M. Jawahar, “A Model of Organizational Justice and Workplace Aggression,” Journal of 
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massacres. Unfortunately, researchers have seldom examined job-related 
factors—only employment status and job types of mass murderers.50 
The goal of this thesis is to do as Lee and McCrie suggest, to focus on job-related factors 
such as grievance response options and organizational grievance systems.  
2. Terrorism 
Insider terrorism is not a commonly studied problem. There is no consensus on the 
definition of terrorism; therefore, this research uses the definition provided by National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. It defines terrorism as 
“the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a 
political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”51 
Since 2000, the Global Terrorism Database contains only three instances of employees in 
the United States committing acts of terrorism in their workplaces that resulted in fatalities: 
the 2009 shooting in Fort Hood, Texas; the 2013 shooting spree of Christopher Dorner in 
California; and the 2015 shooting in San Bernardino, California.52 In all three incidents, 
the insiders experienced perceived workplace injustices.53 Insider terrorism is a form of 
workplace violence. There was no research found on the relationship between distributive, 
procedural, and interactional justice and terrorism committed in the workplace by insiders. 
3. Sabotage 
Maureen Ambrose, Mark Seabright, and Marshall Schminke examined the 
relationship between perceived injustice and workplace sabotage. Sabotage is “behavior 
intended to damage, disrupt, or subvert the organization’s operations for the personal 
purposes of the saboteur by creating unfavorable publicity, embarrassment, delays in 
production, damage to property, the destruction of working relationships, or the harming 
                                                 
50 Lee and McCrie, 14. 
51 “Data Collection Methodology,” Global Terrorism Database, July 2, 2018, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/using-gtd/. 
52 Global Terrorism Database. 
53 Global Terrorism Database. 
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of employees or customers.”54 They determined that injustice is a common motivation for 
workplace sabotage. Low interactional justice is related to sabotage motivated by 
retaliation, whereas low distributive justice is related to sabotage motivated by equity 
restoration. Employees target the organization when they view the organization as the 
source of injustice. When an individual was the source of the perceived injustice, insiders 
equally targeted both organizations and individuals.55 The goal of sabotage is to restore 
equity and express negative emotions. 
CERT researchers created and compared models of insider espionage and 
information technology (IT) system sabotage (Figure 4). They found six common factors 
among saboteurs and spies.56 First, both groups had personal predispositions including 
severe mental health disorders, personality problems, social skills and decision-making 
biases, and a history of rule conflicts.57 Second, saboteurs and spies often experienced 
stressful work and personal events before their attacks. Work-related sanctions and 
conflicts were often present.58 Third, most saboteurs and spies displayed concerning 
behaviors such as security and personnel violations before and during the attacks.59 Fourth, 
in both types of attacks, some technical precursors could have been identified as potential 
or ongoing malicious attacks.60 Fifth, often organizations ignored or did not detect rule 
violations.61 Last, a lack of access controls, both electronic and physical, allowed saboteurs 
                                                 
54 Ambrose, Seabright, and Schminke, “Sabotage in the Workplace,” 948; Michael D. Crino, 
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and spies to carry out attacks.62 These are common factors present in other types of attacks 
as well.  
 
Figure 4. Observations from CERT Research on Espionage and Sabotage63 
4. IP Theft 
CERT also examined 48 cases of IP theft. They identified two personality types 
present in all the cases: the entitled independent (EI) and the ambitious leader (AL).64 EIs 
were involved in 27 cases and ALs in 21 cases.65 An EI is “an insider acting primarily 
alone to steal information to take to a new job or their own side business.”66 EIs join an 
organization wanting to do a good job but with personal predispositions to entitlement. 
Throughout their employment, their contributions become more tangible. Their sense of 
entitlement is increased by organizational praise and telling them how important they are 
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or how their contributions have improved the organization. These actions create a “self-
reinforcing feedback loop” that continues until the insider becomes dissatisfied, commonly 
caused by the denial of a request for raises, benefits, promotions, relocations, or the threat 
of layoffs within the organization.67 Dissatisfaction weakens the insider’s desire to 
contribute and their loyalty to the organization, ultimately causing them to voluntarily exit 
and take IP with them.  
An AL is “a leader who recruits insiders to steal information for some larger 
purpose” including developing a competitive product, using it to benefit their new 
employer, or selling it to a competitor.68 The model for the AL is the same as the EI except 
dissatisfaction was only present in 10% of the cases. The primary motivation for theft was 
an AL’s influence and promises of rewards.69 Insiders in both scenarios showed signs of 
job dissatisfaction (EI 33% and AL 10%), stole IP within their area of responsibility (EI 
74% and AL 86%), and did so even with IP agreements in place (EI 41% and AL 48%).70 
Current employees accounted for 75% of insider IP thefts while 65% were current 
employees who had already accepted another job offer or who were already working for a 
competitor.71 EIs and ALs are examples of insiders motivated by equity injustices. This 
study illustrates why personnel no longer working for an organization should be considered 
as threats. 
5. Fraud 
Brian Martinson et al. studied a total of 3,247 scientists at early- and mid-points in 
their careers to determine whether there was a relationship between perceived unfair 
treatment and behavior that “compromises the integrity of science” such as fraud.72 They 
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found that perceptions of procedural injustice significantly contributed to self-reported 
misbehaviors. A positive correlation exists between distributive injustice and misconduct 
for scientists early in their careers but not so for those who were more established. The 
findings supported the researchers’ hypothesis “that stronger associations between 
perceived organizational injustice and reported misbehavior are to be found among 
scientists who are more likely to face threats to their identity.”73 The study also looked at 
the intrinsic drive. Scientists with high intrinsic drives were more sensitive to procedural 
injustice when they felt their career success was in jeopardy.74 Fraud, like the other types 
of attacks discussed, involves equity restoration, equity sensitivity, and perceptions of 
organizational injustice. 
This section defines the types of insider attacks that are analyzed in this thesis: 
workplace violence, terrorism, sabotage, IP theft, and fraud. Each type of attack is an 
attempt to restore equity and make right a perceived injustice by an individual or the 
organization. Perceived equity or social exchange imbalances, violations of LMX, and low-
perceived organization support cause perceived injustices. 
C. TARGETS 
Targets of violent and non-violent insider threats may be specific individuals within 
the organization (CWB-I), the organization itself (CWB-O), both, or selected at random. 
M. Sandy Hershcovis et al. have identified relationships between CWB-Is and 
interpersonal conflict, distributive justice, anger, negative affect, and gender as well as 
relationships between CWB-Os and anger, negative affect, gender, job dissatisfaction, 
procedural justice, and situational constraints.75 A study by Dwayne Devonish and Dion 
Greenidge found low distributive, procedural, and interactional justice had a significant 
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negative impact on CWB-Is and CWB-Os.76 According to a study by Suzy Fox, Paul 
Spector, and Don Miles, distributive and procedural injustice are organizational stressors 
that cause CWB-Os while interpersonal conflict (interactional injustice) cause CWB-Is.77 
These findings are consistent with the psychology and sociology of workplace 
relationships; individual targets arise from interactional injustice, and organizational 
targets arise from procedural injustice. Distributive injustice can result from CWB-I and 
CWB-O. Supervisors can be seen as agents of the organization and be targets because of 
procedural injustice as well.  
D. INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 
Researchers study individual factors that influence insider threats while often 
ignoring the influence of the organization. The organization’s role is essential. This section 
reviews the literature on individual and organizational factors to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of these influences.  
1. Individual Factors 
Numerous factors influence insider threats on an individual level. These include 
individual personality traits, the relationship between the employee and the employer, and 
external stressors.78 Colquitt et al. say trust propensity (derived from fairness heuristic 
theory) and morality (derived from fairness theory) are moderating variables for reactions 
to procedural and interactional justice. Risk aversion (derived from uncertainty 
management theory) is a moderating variable for procedural, interactional justice, and 
distributive justice effects.79 Richard Huseman, John Hatfield, and Edward Miles’s equity 
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sensitivity construct describe a continuum of sensitivity marked by three types of 
personalities: benevolents, equity sensitives, and entitleds. Benevolents prefer their 
output/income ratio to be less than others, equity sensitives prefer equal output/income 
ratios, and entitleds prefer the output/income ratio to be more than others.80 Justice 
sensitivity at the individual level affects an individual’s perception of injustice and 
response. Other individual characteristics such as negative affect, the locus of control, 
impulse control, information-processing differences, tolerance for ambiguity, attitudinal 
variables (attitude toward revenge), and organizational frustration may also play a role.81 
These are just some of the individual characteristics that influence perceptions of justice. 
Researchers have studied personality types, or traits, and their relationship to 
CWBs. LaMarcus Bolton, Liesl Becker, and Larissa Barber conducted a study to determine 
whether the Big Five personality traits (extroversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, and openness to experience) could predict Spector et al.’s five CWB 
dimensions (abuse, production deviance, sabotage, theft, and withdrawal).82 Bolton, 
Becker, and Barber’s research supported previous research indicating lower agreeableness 
and conscientiousness were predictors of all five CWBs. Low agreeableness led to CWB-
Is and low conscientiousness led to CWB-Os, specifically sabotage and withdrawal. Lower 
extroversion was a predictor of theft while a higher openness to experience was a predictor 
of production deviance.83 Jesús Salgado conducted a meta-analysis to determine whether 
the Big Five personality traits were predictors of absenteeism, accidents, deviant behaviors, 
or turnover. The results indicated that conscientiousness and agreeableness were general 
predictors of turnover and deviant behavior. Emotional stability, openness, and 
                                                 
80 Richard C. Huseman, John D. Hatfield, and Edward W. Miles, “A New Perspective on Equity: The 
Equity Sensitivity Construct,” Academy of Management Review 12, no. 2 (April 1987): 223. 
81  Anne O’Leary-Kelly, Ricky W. Griffin, and David J. Glew, “Organization-Motivated Aggression: 
A Research Framework,” Academy of Management Review 21, no. 1 (January 1996), 247. 
82 LaMarcus R. Bolton, Liesl K. Becker, and Larissa K. Barber, “Big Five Trait Predictors of 
Differential Counterproductive Work Behavior Dimensions,” Personality and Individual Differences 49, 
no. 5 (October 2010): 539, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.03.047. 
83 Bolton, Becker, and Barber, “Big Five Trait Predictors of Differential Counterproductive Work 
Behavior Dimensions,” 540. 
26 
extraversion were predictors of turnover (Figure 5).84 Personality traits may be influential 
factors, but not reliable predictors, of people likely to display CWBs.  
                                                 
84 Jesús F. Salgado, “The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Counterproductive Behaviors,” 




Figure 5. The Big Five Personality Traits and Related Predictions85 
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Anne O’Leary-Kelly, Ricky Griffin, and David Glew agree that individual 
characteristics and organizational environments interact in a way that potentially triggers 
organization-motivated aggression (OMA) and organization-motivated violence (OMV). 
OMA are actions that motivate insiders or outsiders to attempt to cause harm and OMV is 
the outcome of those actions. Individuals obtain aggressive traits through social learning 
in the forms of aversive treatment, incentive inducements, modeling, and the physical 
environment. These learned traits cause individuals to have a higher propensity for violence 
in response to perceived injustice. Social learning of aggression may occur before entering 
the organization or after an individual is already employed due to the organizational 
culture.86 Individual and organizational factors are interdependent. The organization’s 
culture can be a negative influence on employees.  
2. Organizational Factors 
Organizational factors, including reactions to employee grievances, are a 
contributing risk factor and may trigger an insider attack. Insider threat literature 
recommends that organizations have consistent and fair policies, enforcement, and 
termination procedures; however, the literature seldom offers specific recommendations 
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on handling employee grievances.87 Individual and organizational factors do not occur in 
vacuums; their effects are cumulative and reinforce perceptions of injustice. 
Positive organizational factors include a culture that provides fair treatment, 
incentives for appropriate behavior, commitment, positive behavior modeling, and a stable 
physical environment.88 Organizations should address individual aggressive behaviors 
when they occur and proactively ensure a favorable climate for all employees. They should 
have clear values and standards, fair and consistent policies, and grievance procedures and 
train all supervisors and employees on them.89 Organizations should work to build trust, 
commitment, satisfaction among employees, and encourage organizational citizenship 
behaviors (OCB).90 OCBs are “any form of behavior that goes beyond formal expectations 
to support colleagues or the whole organization.”91 These are all ways to create neutral 
social equity exchanges, positive LMX, and high-perceived organizational support. 
Poor leadership and interpersonal skills do not build OCBs; instead, they can lead 
to CWBs. Poor management practices fail to recognize and hold employees accountable 
for issues and behaviors that may lead to a lack of commitment or disengagement. 
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Supervisors should identify, attempt to correct, and report CWBs to maintain a positive 
organizational culture, encourage OCBs, and avoid potential insider attacks.92 According 
to Adrian Furnham and Evelyn Siegel, threats from insiders “[are] nearly always at [their] 
highest in times of change. Emotions run high, trust and justice issues come to the fore 
particularly when it comes to ‘internal communications’ that are more PR than the truth.”93 
Poor leadership and communication lead to interactional justice issues between employees 
and supervisors.  
Insider threats arise from a combination of individual and organizational factors. 
Researchers tend to focus on the prediction and detection of insiders at the individual level. 
Instead, the focus should be on both individual and organizational factors. Individual 
factors include personality traits, relationships, and external stressors; organizations should 
ensure a positive working environment, be consistent and fair, encourage OCBs, and 
address CWBs. 
E. GRIEVANCES 
This thesis uses the sociological definition of perceived injustice—placing the 
blame on someone else. Types of perceived injustice include but are not limited to lack of 
respect, advancement, recognition, use of individual skills, or pay; exclusion; unfair 
policies and procedures; unclear values or standards; sexual harassment; and 
exploitation.94 In their article on the subject, legal scholars William Felstiner, Richard 
Abel, and Austin Sarat describe the formation of grievances in three phases. The first is 
naming—the transformation of unperceived injurious experiences into perceived injurious 
experiences. The second is blaming—the assignment of fault. The third is claiming—the 
communication of the grievance and request for a remedy. When the insider rejects all or 
part of the claim, a dispute occurs. According to the scholars, an employee must perceive 
the event as injurious (unjust), blame the organization, and ask the organization to fix the 
                                                 
92 Furnham and Siegel, 207-208. 
93 Furnham and Siegel, 208. There was no citation for this claim. 
94 Furnham and Siegel. 
31 
problem.95 This researcher does not agree with the claiming requirement; an employee can 
have a grievance without voicing it.  
Grievances are a type of conflict. Conflict is “the process that begins when one 
party perceives that the other has negatively affected, or is about to affect negatively, 
something that he or she cares about.”96 Conflicts, like grievances, start with a triggering 
event. According to Kenneth Thomas, there are three forms of conflict: judgments, goals, 
and normative standards. Judgment conflicts arise from different perceptions or 
conclusions about factual or empirical issues. Goal conflicts occur when parties pursue 
different outcomes, the pursuit of which threatens or obstructs the other party. Normative 
conflicts involve one party’s expectation or evaluation of how another party should behave. 
Types of behavior may be related to status, hierarchy, equity, justice, ethics, and other 
social norms. Events may trigger one or multiple types of conflict.97 All of these conflicts 
occur in the workplace.  
F. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
Employees and managers handle conflict based on their conflict management 
styles. There are five conflict management styles; however, researchers use different terms 
to describe them. The terms followed by a perceived win or loss from the employee and 
organizational perspective are shown in Figure 6. The five styles are avoiding (lose-lose), 
accommodating (obliging, lose-win), competing (dominating, win-lose), compromising 
(neutral), and collaborating (integrating, win-win).98 Two factors are used to classify the 
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factors: assertiveness and cooperation. Assertiveness is the level of concern for meeting 
the employee’s own goals, and cooperation is the level of concern for the other party’s or 
organization’s goals.  
 
Figure 6. Conflict Management Styles 
Per Nelson and Quick: 
• Avoiding is when the employee intentionally takes no action to address 
the conflict or ignores the situation and pretends it does not exist. The 
avoidance style demonstrates low employee assertiveness and low 
cooperation. The exit mechanism might be an example of avoidance if the 
employee did not attempt to resolve the conflict before leaving.  
• Accommodating is when the employee disregards their own goals to fulfill 
the organization’s goals and eliminate conflict. Accommodating 
demonstrates low employee assertiveness and high cooperation. Loyalty is 
a form of accommodating.  
33 
• Competing is when an employee is willing to satisfy their desires at the 
expense of someone else or the organization. The employee is very 
assertive and uncooperative. Neglect is a form of competing. 
• Compromising is when the employee and other party or organization, 
usually of relatively equal status or power, each give something. It is not 
an ideal conflict style, as the relationship between the parties may not 
improve because of the sacrifice each had to make. Compromising shows 
mid-level assertiveness and cooperation. 
• Collaborating is considered a win-win style because each party is satisfied 
with the outcome. It requires trust and the sharing of information and ideas 
from both parties and may lead to improved performance and 
relationships. Collaborating displays high assertiveness and cooperation. 
The voice mechanism is an example of both compromising and 
collaboration.99 
Individuals usually have a preferred style that can change based on the people 
involved and the situation.  
1. Individual Conflict Management  
Conflict is not bad; however, severe escalation disrupts the function of an 
organization. Dean Pruitt recommends “when it is necessary to take actions that annoy 
people (e.g., criticism, discipline, and discharge of popular employees), one should strive 
for legitimacy and the basic elements of fairness.”100 Essential elements of fairness include 
“careful fact gathering, consistent criteria, unbiased decision making, and avenues for 
appeal. The people impacted should have a chance to defend themselves, and the decisions 
should be fully explained in a way that shows respect for and sensitivity to the target of the 
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action.”101 Fairness can be challenging to obtain in high pressure or time-sensitive 
situations. 
Barry Goldman et al. have noted how supervisors handle conflict in different ways. 
They use one of six taxonomies when dealing with conflict: advising (facilitation), 
mediation, adversarial (adjudication, arbitration), autocratic (inquisitorial), providing 
impetus (motivational) control, and avoidance (ignoring). 
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Table 1. Six Taxonomies Supervisors Use for Dealing with Conflict.102 
 
• Advising is when the supervisor influences process control only to achieve 
a practical conclusion. Some research indicates parties may be willing to 
relinquish process control under certain conditions such as serious conflicts, 
the need for a fast resolution, when parties need to maintain status or 
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reputation, or when there is a high level of cooperation. Parties may also 
relinquish decision control if they feel the resolution will be successful.  
• Mediation is when the supervisor controls the process but not the resolution. 
• Adversarial is when the parties manage the process by listening to each 
present their case but the supervisor controls the final decision by issuing 
an opinion. 
• Autocratic is when the supervisor controls both the process and the decision. 
• Motivation is when the supervisor retains a low level or process and 
outcome control but provides incentives for the parties to reach an 
agreement. 
• Avoidance is when the supervisor does nothing.103 
These taxonomies can lead to varying perceptions of procedural, distributive, and 
interactive justice due to the shift of process control and outcome control between 
employees and supervisors.  
Perceived workplace injustices are a form of conflict. Targets (or victims) of 
workplace aggression frequently used collaboration to resolve the conflict. Collaboration 
is usually an effective strategy for long-term conflict but not for targets of workplace 
aggression. When collaboration did not work, targets of workplace violence tried a range 
of conflict management styles and most often settled on avoidance and exit.104 Avoidance, 
collaboration, and accommodation were ineffective management styles for victims of 
workplace aggression, particularly those of low hierarchical status.105 Integration (an 
assertive management style) and accommodation (a passive management style) both 
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appear to increase a low-status employee’s chance of being victimized. Potential 
victimization, in turn, may make them feel competing (CWBs) is the only viable outcome 
as a compromise does not work when the parties have unequal status.106 This literature 
explains why workplace violence victims choose CWBs. With this knowledge, 
organizations may have the opportunity to intervene before an attack. 
2. Organizational Dispute Resolution  
Organizational dispute resolution (ODR) systems are “any process identified in 
organizational policy as a sanctioned means to resolve disputes within the 
organization.”107 In this research, ODR is synonymous with ADR. Grievance procedures 
are typically used to describe appeals processes agreed upon by management and unions. 
The presence or absence of a union is not a factor in this research. In 1995, the U.S. General 
Accounting Office estimated that “almost all employers with 100 or more employees use 
one or more ADR approaches.”108 ADR approaches include negotiation, fact-finding, peer 
review, mediation (both internal and external), and arbitration.109 ADR processes can vary 
as to whether there are formal procedures, the type of complaints eligible for the operation, 
who can make final decisions, whether parties can have representation, and criteria used to 
settle disputes. ADR processes may include employees speaking directly with each other, 
employees presenting their cases to supervisors (open-door policy) with the ability to 
appeal the decision to higher management, the use of neutral third parties (trained 
mediators or ombudspersons), and multi-step appeals processes.110  
Organizations may choose to adopt ODR systems to reduce turnover or litigation 
due to conflict, particularly among high-wage and tenure employees. Organizations adopt 
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ODR systems to capitalize on the positive outcomes that accompany practices that 
encourage the use of voice, productive conflict management, and fair treatment. ODR 
systems are a common characteristic of high-performance work systems, which 
“encompass a set of complementary work and HR-related practices aimed at promoting 
high levels of employee commitment and involvement in the workplace, with the ultimate 
goal to increase work quality, productivity, and customer responsiveness.”111 Increased 
commitment and involvement are factors in how employees choose to respond to perceived 
workplace injustice. 
A lack of suitable exit options may be a reason for increased use of voice in the 
form of ODR systems. Other factors may include the organizational culture and norms for 
voicing grievances. Employees seldom use ODR systems in organizations where voicing 
grievances are perceived as being viewed in a negative way or as damaging relationships. 
They also avoid ODR systems in organizations where conflict avoidance is the norm.112 
The presence of ODR systems and culture are organizational factors that affect how 
employees respond to perceived workplace injustice. 
Certain features of ODR systems cause higher perceptions of procedural justice: 
credibility, employee input, familiarity, and the inclusion of neutral third parties. The most 
critical factor is credibility. Perceived credibility of the procedures affects perceived 
fairness, which increases the likelihood of ODR system use. Procedures that allow for 
employees’ input, even if the decision is not what they wanted, are perceived as more fair. 
Organizations must have systems to ensure employees do not feel like their complaints fall 
on deaf ears as this exacerbates perceived injustice. Neutral third parties and non-
managerial decision-makers increase perceptions of fairness. Balancing consistency and 
flexibility with employees is an essential factor although the two are opposite 
characteristics.  
The level of organizational communication about ODR systems plays a role in 
employee usage. If employees are unaware of the system or how to access its components, 
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they will not use it or perceive it as fair and available to everyone. Employees may choose 
to use an ODR system based on the type of conflict, the relationship between the parties 
involved, their characteristics, and their loyalty to the organization.113 In order for ODR 
systems to be effective, employees must perceive them as fair, well-known, and accessible 
to all.  
ODR system outcomes range from unfavorable to neutral to favorable. Most of the 
analyses focused only on the multi-step option. Organizations that adopt ODR systems are 
likely to see a positive effect, yet employees who use these systems experience neutral or 
adverse effects. However, organizations that offer more than one form of ODR may 
experience an increase in desired individual outcomes, perceptions of fairness, and the 
effectiveness of the organization. These outcomes may be due to individual differences in 
conflict management styles and comfort levels with particular ODR system factors. By 
offering multiple ODR processes to choose from, employees have the freedom to choose 
the method they perceive as fair for their specific grievance.114 Perceived procedural 
fairness is an essential step in mitigating grievances.  
G. SUMMARY 
A comprehensive literature review provides the background for this research. 
Counterproductive work behaviors can be passive or active. Targets can be individuals, 
organizations, or both. Employees may target supervisors as individuals and extensions of 
the organization. Individual and organizational factors influence employee responses to 
perceived workplace injustices. Different factors motivate specific types of insider attacks; 
organizations with higher threat levels for these attacks should take note of the differences. 
Employees experience a grievance (conflict) when they blame the organization (or 
someone within the organization). Individuals manage conflict differently; therefore, 
organizations should have multiple, credible, well-known ADR process that allows for 
employee input and neutral third parties.  
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND GRIEVANCE RESPONSE MODEL 
Each of the three research questions is answered using a different research design. 
A. HOW DO EMPLOYEES RESPOND TO PERCEIVED WORKPLACE 
INJUSTICES?   
Organizational justice literature frequently references four theories: equity, social 
exchange, agency, and LMX theory. These theories explain how perceptions of injustice, 
or inequity, occur based on interactions between employees and organizations. In order to 
answer this question, a conceptual descriptive model of employee responses to perceived 
workplace injustices was designed based on ELVN.  
1. Equity Theory 
Equity theory states that people compare the ratio of their outputs to the inputs of 
others. The ratio may be higher, lower, or equal. Inequity occurs when the ratio is not equal 
and causes dissatisfaction.115 The parties will attempt to eliminate the inequity by actually 
or cognitively altering their inputs and outcomes or those of others, leaving the field, or 
changing the object of comparison. The higher the inequity, the more distress a person 
experiences and the harder they will work to restore equity.116 Equity theory may apply to 
individual employees or an employee and a larger group. 
Equity theory is not widely accepted as initially proposed. Huseman, Hatfield, and 
Miles propose a variation of equity theory called the “equity sensitivity construct.” They 
propose “individuals react in consistent but individually different ways to both perceived 
equity and inequity because they have different preferences for (i.e., are differentially 
sensitive to) equity.”117 Leventhal agrees equity theory is not comprehensive enough 
because it focuses only on the final distribution of rewards and not on allocation 
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procedures.118 Allocators do not distribute rewards based solely on contribution; they are 
distributed on need and equality as well.119 Michael Carrell and John Dittrich also express 
issues with equity theory and propose the fairness model whereby a person compares their 
inputs and outcomes and the allocation system to an internally derived standard.120 
Employee perceptions of fairness may not only be based on more than inputs and outputs 
but also individual sensitivity and allocation of rewards.  
2. Social Exchange Theory 
Suzanne Masterson et al. applied social exchange theory to organizations as a 
means of describing relationships among employees, supervisors, and organizations. Social 
exchange theory goes beyond quantifiable economic exchanges where one party pays 
another party for goods or services. According to social exchange theory, one party makes 
an unspecified contribution to another and expects something in return at a later time. The 
receiver feels obligated to reciprocate. These relationships exist between employees and 
immediate supervisors as well as employees and the organization.121 Social exchange 
theory explains how employees experience perceived injustice when they make 
contributions but perceive unequal, untimely, or no reciprocation from supervisors or 
organizations.  
3. Agency Theory 
Agency and social exchange theory are the basis of the supervisor-employee 
relationship. Agency theory describes the economic relationship between supervisors 
(managers) and employees. Supervisors delegate decisions and tasks to employees in return 
for compensation. This transaction has two risks. The employee’s risk depends on how 
they receive compensation and are affected by circumstances beyond their control. The 
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supervisor’s risk stems from the employee’s incompetence or opportunism. Therefore, the 
supervisor institutes mechanisms to monitor the employee or base their compensation on 
their performance.122 Managerial trustworthy behavior is “volitional actions and 
interactions performed by managers that are necessary though not sufficient to engender 
employees’ trust in them.”123 Managerial trustworthiness, as perceived by employees, can 
be divided into five categories: behavioral consistency, behavioral integrity, sharing and 
delegation of control, communication, and demonstration of concern.124 Supervisors and 
employees have economic and social equities to balance, which influence perceptions of 
procedural and interactive justice.  
4. Leader-Member Exchange Theory 
LMX theory describes positive and negative relationships between employees and 
supervisors. Positive LMXs are seen as informal and built on trust and support. According 
to Whitener et al., trust is defined by three factors: an expectation the other party will act 
benevolently, the risk of vulnerability because the other party cannot be forced to act 
benevolently, and a level of dependency where one party’s actions influence the other 
party’s outcome.125 Negative LMXs view employee-supervisor relationships as a required 
interaction, distant, and less supportive.126 Perceived organizational support is similar to 
LMX except the relationship is between the employee and the organization.127 While 
social equity theory broadly describes transactions that occur in relationships, LMX theory 
applies specifically to the employee and supervisor workplace relationship.  
                                                 
122 Ellen M. Whitener et al., “Managers as Initiators of Trust: An Exchange Relationship Framework 
for Understanding Managerial Trustworthy Behavior,” Academy of Management Review 23, no. 3 (July 
1998): 514-515. 
123 Whitener et al., 516. 
124 Whitener et al. 
125 Whitener et al., 513. 
126 Russell Cropanzano, Cynthia A. Prehar, and Peter Y. Chen, “Using Social Exchange Theory to 
Distinguish Procedural from Interactional Justice,” Group & Organization Management 27, no. 3 
(September 2002): 327-334, https://doi.org/10.1177/1059601102027003002; Masterson et al., “Integrating 
Justice and Social Exchange,” 740. 
127 Masterson et al. 
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Russell Cropanzano, Cynthia Prehar, and Peter Chen, as well as Masterson et al., 
conducted studies supporting social exchange theory and LMX as a means to differentiate 
procedural from interactional justice in the workplace. Social transactions between 
employees and the organization are related to procedural justice, and transactions between 
employees and supervisors are related to interactional justice.128 This distinction may offer 
insight into why employees target individuals, particularly supervisors, versus 
organizations. According to social exchange theory, employees and supervisors’ 
exchanges can be perceived as personal, whereas exchanges with the organization are 
economic. Employees may perceive a supervisor’s actions to be a personal insult rather 
than a byproduct of the supervisor’s role in the organization. Equity, social exchange, 
agency, and LMX theories provide a psychological and sociological basis for 
understanding the relationships between employees, supervisors, and organizations. 
B. GRIEVANCE RESPONSE MODEL  
The goal of this research was to create a conceptual grievance response model to 
describe how employees respond to perceived workplace injustices. The model provides 
the opportunity for earlier intervention to prevent insider attacks identified earlier in the 
MERIT model. The model applies to all types of insider attacks and represents responses 
insiders use to address perceived workplace injustices (Figure 7). ELVN theory was 
modified to develop exit, loyalty, voice, and CWBs (ELVC) theory. Neglect was 
exchanged for CWBs because neglect is a type of CWB, but its definition is too narrow to 
represent all CWBs adequately. 
                                                 
128 Cropanzano, Prehar, and Chen, “Using Social Exchange Theory to Distinguish Procedural from 
Interactional Justice,” 329. 
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Figure 7. Grievance Response Model 
The grievance response model begins with an event. People perceive events 
differently for many reasons. One insider might view a work location transfer as a positive 
event, whereas another might see it as an adverse event. The insider who perceives the 
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transfer as a positive event does not continue through this model because they do not 
perceive the event as injurious. Numerous individual, situational, and organizational 
factors influenced whether insiders perceived the event, consciously or subconsciously, as 
an injurious event. These factors may, but not always, lead to blaming the organization or 
an individual representing the organization for the perceived injustice. The employee then 
decides which of the four mechanisms they will use to address the grievance: loyalty, exit, 
voice, or CWBs. The mechanism chosen may be based on the severity of the perceived 
injustice, the relationship of the parties involved, the perceived availability and success 
each mechanism may have, and the employee’s preferred conflict management style. If the 
employee does not assign blame, they do not proceed through this model. 
Loyalty describes the situation in which the employee perceives an injustice and 
blames the organization but decides to remain loyal to it. The employee may do this 
because they does not perceive the injury to be significant enough to warrant further action; 
they have a high level of organizational commitment, or they believe no other mechanism 
will change the outcome. Loyalty can be seen as a form of accommodation because the 
employee demonstrates low assertiveness and high (accommodation) cooperation. By 
remaining loyal, the employee sacrifices his or her own goals to prevent conflict with the 
organization. The employee loses because they does not actively address the perceived 
injustice and the organization wins because it retains the employee. Loyalty does not have 
to last forever. An employee may initially decide to remain loyal but later decide they 
cannot ignore or suppress the feelings of injustice and pursue other mechanisms. 
Exit happens when the employee voluntarily leaves the environment they blamed 
for the perceived injustice. Exiting may mean changing work locations, departments, 
resigning, or retiring. The critical factor is the voluntary exit of the employee, not 
termination. Exit can be seen as a form of avoidance if the employee does not address the 
grievance before leaving. The exit option is lose-lose because the employee loses their 
tenure and the organization loses an employee and incurs the financial cost of replacement. 
Depending on the situation, exit may be in the best interest of both the employee and the 
organization if loyalty and voice (in the form of compromise or collaboration) are not 
possible.  
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Employees who exit may still commit attacks. For this research, both current and 
former employees are considered insiders due to their potentially increased trust, 
knowledge, and access even after they leave. Therefore, an employee may still display 
loyalty to an organization after leaving by maintaining a high level of respect for the 
organization. An employee may also use the voice mechanism through external dispute 
resolution systems or litigation. After voluntarily exiting the organization, employees may 
choose to display CWBs such as harassment or unauthorized access to facilities or 
technology systems. Therefore, a standard recommendation from violent and non-violent 
insider threat prevention literature is for employers to immediately terminate access to 
systems and facilities when employees leave voluntarily or involuntarily regardless of how 
amicable the separation appears.129 
Employees use the voice mechanism by participating in the organization’s justice 
system. When the employee notifies the organization of the perceived injustice, indicates 
the organization’s involvement in the problem, and requests its participation in the solution, 
these actions exemplify voice. The notification may be formal or informal depending on 
the organization’s policies and procedures for grievance intake. Distributive, procedural, 
and interactional justice influence the use of voice. Voice can be compromising or 
collaborative depending on whether—and to what extent—each side concedes their goals 
to achieve resolution. In both situations, the employee shows some assertiveness toward 
achieving their own goals as well as concern for the organization’s goals (cooperativeness). 
Voice is a neutral or winning outcome for both the employee and the organization. 
Compromising is not a bad outcome if the relationships remain positive between the 
parties. There is a chance one or both parties will stay disgruntled because their goals 
remain partially unmet. Employees may perceive this disgruntlement as a further injustice. 
CWBs are an employee’s active or passive behavior that hurt the organization. They 
range from minor to severe offenses. Attacks are types of CWBs, although for this research, 
attacks are illustrated as separate events because not all CWBs are attacks. Attacks may be 
                                                 
129 Band et al., Comparing Insider IT Sabotage and Espionage, viii, 41; Lee and McCrie, Mass 
Homicides by Employees in the American Workplace, 14. 
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acts of omission or commission. Acts of omission involve a failure to perform mandatory 
duties, which include behaviors such as failing to report to work on time, complete assigned 
work, report violations, withdrawal, and neglect. Acts of commission involve active 
behaviors such as aggression, substance abuse while on duty, bullying, and production 
deviance. CWBs result from the competing conflict management style because the 
employee is assertive in achieving their own goals of retaliation while having a low concern 
(cooperativeness) for the organization’s goals. The employee wins by acting out their 
feelings of perceived injustice, but the organization loses because it is the target of the 
hurtful actions. 
This model does not explicitly categorize conflict management styles or grievance 
mechanisms as good or bad except for CWBs. Goals and situations differ for employees 
and organizations. Disgruntled employees and organizations may benefit from the 
employee exiting rather than remaining and engaging in CWBs. Disgruntled employees 
may be content with remaining loyal to an organization despite experiencing a perceived 
injustice. Employees may use multiple mechanisms simultaneously or concurrently 
depending on the perceived success and repercussions. For example, an employee may 
choose to use their voice while also displaying CWBs. Another employee may remain loyal 
initially but later decide to use their voice, then exit the organization and subsequently 
engage in CWBs such as harassment. Thus, the arrows between the mechanisms are 
bidirectional.  
The time spent on each mechanism may range from minutes to years. Most if not 
all employees display behaviors, motivations, and risk factors before committing both 
violent and non-violent insider attacks; however, co-workers may not recognize the 
warning signs.130 Therefore, the model does not show a direct pathway between 
organizational blame and insider attack. Attack behaviors are a type of CWBs. Thus, 
CWBs are considered an intermediary, even if brief, step. The organizational response to 
an employee’s chosen grievance mechanism may itself become a perceived injustice if the 
employee is not satisfied.  
                                                 
130 Lee and McCrie, 8; Band et al., viii, 46. 
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C. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE RESPONSES 
TO PERCEIVED WORKPLACE INJUSTICES AND INSIDER 
ATTACKS?  
The model created to answer the first question is tested using case studies of insider 
attacks. For violent attacks, the researcher collected original data collected on type III 
(employee on employee) workplace violence and insider terrorist incidents involving at 
least one fatality in the United States from 2000 to 2017 (Appendix A). The researcher 
found the cases on publicly available databases such as Lexis-Nexis and Internet search 
engines such as Google for primary and secondary source information. There is no database 
of workplace violence attacks; the United States Department of Labor only keeps total 
numbers of injuries and homicides.131 The Global Terrorism Database, publicly available 
and maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Response 
to Terrorism, was used to identify insider terrorist attacks. The researcher used the 
following search terms: “employee,” “coworker,” “workplace violence,” “homicide,” 
“insider,” and “insider attack.”  
Case studies were limited to attacks where the motivation appeared to involve an 
insider’s grievance with one or more individuals representing an organization or the 
organization itself. Most of the studies in the literature review used surveys to determine 
how people would hypothetically respond to situations involving perceived injustice. 
Studying insider attacks eliminates response bias and measures actual behaviors. 
Workplace violence attacks that appeared to be criminal acts (type I), acts perpetrated by 
customers (type II), or motivated by domestic disputes (type IV) were not considered. The 
data points for each insider attack appear in Table 2 The goal is to look for trends among 
the general insider attack data and compare them to trends (if identified) in violent and 
non-violent attacks as well as their subtypes.  
 
                                                 
131 “Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI),” United States Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, last modified February 20, 2018, https://stats.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm. 
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Table 2. Data Points of Violent Insider Attacks in the United States 
 from 2000–2017 
Data Point Coding 
Sub-type Workplace Violence, Terrorism 
Employment status Current, Resigned, Retired, Fired 
If not current, the period between 
employment and the attack 
Days to years 
If insider survived the attack Yes, No (suicide or killed by police) 
Reason for grievance Mistreatment, Performance, Debt 
Grievance response mechanism Exit, Loyalty, Voice, CWBs 
Target of the attack Individual, Organization, Both 
Psychiatric or intellectual disability Yes, No 
Criminal history Yes, No 
 
The violent attack sub-type specifically identifies insider terrorist attacks cases 
among other workplace violence attacks. The insider’s employment status is recorded to 
determine whether the insider committed the attack while employed or after they leave the 
organization. Insiders not employed at the time of the attack were noted as voluntarily 
(resigned or retired) or involuntarily (fired) separated from the organization. Whether the 
insider lived through the attack or not was recorded as a potential explanation for lack of 
data.  
The reason for the grievance came from publicly available information from the 
insider, witnesses, co-workers, and law enforcement. When the sources provided multiple 
reasons, the researcher only counted the primary one. “Mistreatment” included workplace 
disputes and allegations of discrimination and harassment. The disputes may be ongoing 
or occur immediately before the attack. “Performance” included reports of poor 
performance, counseling by supervisors, poor performance evaluations, and discipline 
including transfers, demotions, termination. Financial grievances include personal debts 
that caused the insider stress, garnishment of wages by the employer, and greed. The 
grievance mechanism was determined by analyzing the insider’s behavior before the attack 
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to the extent it is known. CWBs were any undesirable work behaviors observed before the 
attack not including the attack itself. The target was coded as “individual” if the insider 
appeared to hunt for specific people, “organization” if they did not, and “both” if the 
victims appeared to be intentional and random.  
The presence of psychiatric or intellectual disabilities was coded as “yes” if the 
condition was diagnosed or reasonably suspected. This data may not be highly accurate as 
insiders may have been undiagnosed or the people interviewed were not aware of the 
diagnosis. The researcher did not record specific criminal offenses; the intent was to 
capture a history of rule-breaking in general. No criminal histories were verified directly 
with law enforcement. The reliability of this data is also questionable; the people 
interviewed may not have known about the insider’s criminal history, or the insider 
engaged in criminal behavior but was not caught, prosecuted, or found guilty.  
The data collected is compared to similar data from a case study done by Lee and 
McCrie, Mass Homicides by Employees in the American Workplace.132 The researchers 
studied mass workplace homicides (at least three fatalities) committed by insiders in the 
United States from 1986 to 2011.133 Lee and McCrie did not identify the events they 
studied; therefore, some events may appear in this research as well. The comparison 
identifies similarities and differences in the data coding and findings.  
For non-violent attacks, publicly available data was not available at the level of 
detail needed. Therefore, this section analyzed data from four research papers that 
conducted case studies on insider attacks. The case studies involved sabotage, IP theft, and 
fraud in the United States. The data from the violent and non-violent data and their subsets 
are compared to identify similarities and differences.  
                                                 
132 Lee and McCrie, Mass Homicides by Employees in the American Workplace, 14. 
133 Lee and McCrie, 5. 
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D. HOW CAN ORGANIZATIONS PREVENT DISGRUNTLED EMPLOYEES 
FROM COMMITTING ATTACKS? 
Using information from the literature review, this section demonstrates how 
organizations may determine how their employees might react by utilizing employee 
responses to perceived workplace injustice. With this information, they can evaluate and 
change organizational policies to encourage positive employee responses in order to 
prevent insider attacks. This section uses a case study of the Fairfax County local 
government and Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department (FCFRD) in Fairfax County, 
Virginia, to illustrate this process. The FCFRD, like most public safety agencies, is similar 
to the military in culture and rank structure and different from other county agencies. The 
FCFRD grievance systems are compared to the United States Marine Corps (USMC) to 
provide analysis between non-military agencies (Fairfax County Government), 
paramilitary agencies (FCFRD), and a military branch (USMC).  
The case study analyzes how three factors that influence employee responses (cost 
of exit, cost of voice, and incentives to remain loyal) to perceived workplace injustices 
(from the model used to describe how do employees respond to perceived workplace 
injustices) apply to FCFRD employees. It assesses whether the Fairfax County 
government’s grievance systems, as applied within the FCFRD, use best practices for ODR 





IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE 
RESPONSES AND INSIDER ATTACKS 
The researcher encountered two main obstacles to identifying specific employee 
responses: a lack of data and multiple, contradictory, and missing narratives. Publicly 
available data was difficult to find. Few insider attack cases received widespread and 
ongoing media coverage, which limited the amount and depth of data available. In most 
violent cases when there was no suspect to prosecute because the insider died, in-depth 
investigations were either not conducted or publicly released. According to a 2004 survey 
by CSO Magazine, the top three reasons organizations do not legally pursue insider attacks 
are fear of negative publicity, lack of evidence, and the damage sustained was not 
significant enough to involve law enforcement.134 Organizations that conducted internal 
investigations did not release the findings possibly due to privacy concerns or fear of 
damage to their image, civil or criminal liability, or that detailing system weaknesses may 
lead to future attacks.  
There are multiple, contradictory, and missing narratives. The people interviewed 
by reporters provided multiple and sometimes contradictory narratives and had varying 
perceptions of what led to the attacks. The researcher considered their perspectives and 
motivations for providing information. The insiders and immediate co-workers died in over 
half of the violent cases; therefore, the people with first-hand knowledge of the 
circumstances leading to the attack could not provide their perspective (Figure 8). These 
obstacles are not unique to this thesis as Lee and McCrie noted insider death during violent 
attacks as a hindrance in their research as well.135 The lack of direct communication from 
insiders who committed violent attacks created speculation as to the perceived injurious 
event, grievance, and motivations for the attacks.  
 
                                                 
134 CERT, CSO Magazine, and United States Secret Service, 2004 E-Crime Watch Survey 
(Framington, MA: CSO Magazine), 2004, 18, https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/
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Figure 8. Comparison between Violent Insider Data and Lee and McCrie’s 
Study on Mass Workplace Homicide Committed by Employees136 
A few insiders left manifestos explaining their actions, one of which was 
Christopher Dorner, formerly of the Los Angeles Police Department. Dorner left a detailed 
11-page manifesto of his grievances and attempted to use the voice option before the attack 
and subsequent suicide.137 Insider communication was less of a limitation for non-violent 
attacks since most of the insiders were still alive. Non-violent insiders told their stories 
during investigations and legal proceedings. 
                                                 
136 Compiled from data in Appendix A; Adapted from Lee and McCrie, 16. 
137 Christopher Dorner, “Manifesto,” KPBS, accessed October 13, 2018, https://www.kpbs.org/
documents/2013/feb/07/christopher-dorners-manifesto/. 
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A. VIOLENT ATTACK DATA AND ANALYSIS 
The researcher identified a total of 90 violent insider attack cases: 87 workplace 
violence and three terrorism. The terrorism cases are included in the workplace violence 
data because they are a form of workplace violence (Appendix B). The terrorism data was 
also analyzed separately (Appendix C). Then the researcher compared the workplace 
violence and terrorism data to Lee and McCrie’s mass workplace homicide study 
(Appendix D). 
Data from all three studies provide insight into violent attackers; however, the data 
do not indicate any relationship or correlation between employee responses and insider 
attacks. Specific information on which responses attackers used was not available, except 
exit. Insiders who exited the organization were easy to identify. Although exit is voluntary, 
the researcher documented insiders who were forced to leave. The researcher assumed that 
employers terminated the insiders for committing CWBs. Insiders may have used 
additional response mechanisms that were unreported.  
The period between the grievance and the attack may indicate loyalty; however, it 
is unknown if CWBs occurred during that time. Insiders may have been holding grudges 
but not taking action. They may have exhibited CWBs co-workers did not see or report. In 
the absence of communication from insiders, it was undetermined if they voiced their 
grievance to their organization, what procedures they used, or their perceptions of 
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice.  
The organization did not actively employ almost half of the insiders at the time of 
the act (Figure 9). Some attacks occurred almost immediately after separation, others years 
later (Figure 10). The studies prove that current and former employees are threats to the 
organization and remain so years after exiting. The data support the removal of insider 
access to the organization upon exit immediately, regardless of why they leave. 
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Figure 9. Comparison between Violent Insider Data and Lee and McCrie’s 
Study on Mass Workplace Homicide Committed by Employees.138 
                                                 
138 Compiled from data in Appendix A; Adapted from Lee and McCrie, Mass Homicides by 
Employees in the American Workplace, 17. 
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Figure 10. Comparison between Violent Insider Data and Lee and McCrie’s 
Study on Mass Workplace Homicide Committed by Employees.139 
The most common perceived workplace injustices are related to mistreatment, 
performance, or financial difficulties such as garnished wages (Figure 11). In violent 
insider attack cases, economic grievances were due to wage garnishment. The most 
common grievance was mistreatment, demonstrating the powerful influence of perceived 
interactional injustice. Lee and McCrie noted revenge or anger as motivation in 89% of the 
cases.140 Revenge correlates with social equity theory; employees use revenge to restore 
equity. Insiders may experience multiple grievances and motivations. The lack of specific 
data and the inability to speak to the insiders make determining proximate and root causes 
difficult. 
                                                 
139 Compiled from data in Appendix A; Adapted from Lee and McCrie, 17. 
140 Lee and McCrie, 17. 
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Figure 11. Reasons for Grievances from Violent Insider Data141 
In both studies, over half of the targets were individuals (Figure 12). Lee and 
McCrie noted that two-thirds of the individual attacks were against supervisors. 
Supervisors represent procedural and interactional justice as described in agency and social 
exchange theory. They are judged as extensions of the organization and may be blamed 
(targeted) for policies and decisions beyond their control. Employees may also hold them 
responsible for distributive justice. Supervisors may represent an individual and 
organizational target.  
                                                 
141 Compiled from data in Appendix A.  
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Figure 12. Targets of Violent Insider Attacks from Violent Insider Data142 
According to both studies, fewer than one-third of insiders had psychiatric issues, 
intellectual disabilities, or criminal histories (Figures 13 and 14). Organizations cannot 
eliminate insider threats by not hiring people with mental illness or criminal histories; 
focusing on data points such as these distract organizations from recognizing CWBs that 
may lead to attacks. 
 
Figure 13. Comparison between Violent Insider Data and Lee and McCrie’s 
Study on Mass Workplace Homicide Committed by Employees.143 
                                                 
142 Compiled from data in Appendix A.  
143 Compiled from data in Appendix A; Adapted from Lee and McCrie, 17. 
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Figure 14. Comparison between Violent Insider Data and Lee and McCrie’s 
Study on Mass Workplace Homicide Committed by Employees.144 
B. NON-VIOLENT ATTACK DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Non-violent cases were more difficult to identify using publicly available sources 
potentially due to a lack of media attention. Therefore, the researcher analyzed four 
research studies conducted by CERT that contained many of the same data points. The 
studies focused on critical infrastructure computer system sabotage and illegal cyber 
activity in the banking, finance, government, information technology, and 
telecommunications sectors (Appendix E).145 The cases occurred during the late 1990s to 
early 2000s and involved fraud, theft IP and confidential information, and sabotage. Non-
violent insider attacks were carried out by a combination of current and former employees. 
In two studies, the organization did not employ almost half of the insiders when they 
committed the attacks, and they had terminated one-third to one-half of the unemployed 
insiders (Figures 15 and 16). These results are similar to the violent cases, emphasizing the 
need to define former employees as potential insider threats. Approximately one-third had 
                                                 
144 Compiled from data in Appendix A; Adapted from Lee and McCrie, 13. 
145 Michelle Keeney et al., Insider Threat Study: Computer System Sabotage in Critical Infrastructure 
Sectors (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, May 2005), https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/
SpecialReport/2005_003_001_51946.pdf; Marisa Reddy Randazzo et al., Insider Threat Study: Illicit 
Cyber Activity in the Banking and Finance Sector (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, June 
2005), https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/TechnicalReport/2005_005_001_14420.pdf; Eileen 
Kowalski, Dawn Cappelli and Andrew Moore, Insider Threat Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the 
Information Technology and Telecommunications Sector (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 
January 2008) (http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a638653.pdf; Eileen Kowalski et al., Insider Threat 
Study: Illicit Cyber Activity in the Government Sector (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 
January 2008), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a638652.pdf. 
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a criminal history (Figure 17). Researchers did not indicate if the insiders had a psychiatric 
history.  
 
Figure 15. Comparison of Non-violent Insider Attack Data from Four CERT 
Studies.146 
                                                 
146 Adapted from Keeney et al.; Randazzo et al.; Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore; Kowalski et al. 
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Figure 16. Comparison of Non-violent Insider Attack Data from Four CERT 
Studies.147 
                                                 
147 Adapted from Keeney et al.; Randazzo et al.; Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore; Kowalski et al. 
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Figure 17. Comparison of Non-violent Insider Attack Data from Four CERT 
Studies.148 
Grievances arose from both mistreatment and performance in approximately half of 
the cases depending on the field of study (Figure 18). These numbers are similar to the violent 
case studies. Additional motivations varied in the non-violent cases. Financial motivations 
were the highest (81%) in the banking and finance industries. Revenge was a motivation in 
all four studies and the highest in critical infrastructure and IT industries (Figure 19). 
Revenge may be related to CWBs noticed by supervisors. The critical infrastructure and IT 
industries had the highest percentage of CWBs noticed by supervisors (97% and 30%) and 
also the highest percentage of consequences (74% and 70%) (Figure 20). The recognition 
and consequences of CWBs could be a motivation for revenge (Figure 21). 
                                                 
148 Adapted from Keeney et al.; Randazzo et al.; Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore; Kowalski et al. 
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Figure 18. Comparison of Non-violent Insider Attack Data from Four CERT 
Studies.149 
                                                 
149 Adapted from Keeney et al.; Randazzo et al.; Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore; Kowalski et al. 
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Figure 19. Comparison of Non-violent Insider Attack Data from Four CERT 
Studies.150 
                                                 
150 Adapted from Keeney et al.; Randazzo et al.; Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore; Kowalski et al. 
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Figure 20. Comparison of Non-violent Insider Attack Data from Four CERT 
Studies.151 
                                                 
151 Adapted from Keeney et al.; Randazzo et al.; Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore; Kowalski et al. 
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Figure 21. Comparison of Non-violent Insider Attack Data from Four CERT 
Studies.152 
C. SUMMARY 
The unavailability of specific data was an obstacle for violent and non-violent 
cases. Although the data needed to correlate specific employee responses to perceived 
workplace injustices with insider attacks was not available, the analysis of the available 
data has value. The violent and non-violent attack data emphasizes the need for 
organizations to immediately remove all physical and cyber access from employees who 
leave voluntarily and involuntarily.  
The most common grievances are related to mistreatment and performance. In both 
violent and non-violent attacks, half of the insider’s perceived injustice appears to have 
stemmed from mistreatment. Performance issues accounted for 20–47% of grievances. 
Mistreatment may be related to social equity imbalances while performance may be related 
to a more economical and direct imbalance of expectations and contributions. No violent 
                                                 
152 Adapted from Keeney et al.; Randazzo et al.; Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore; Kowalski et al. 
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attacks appeared to be committed for financial gain, but 9% were related to mounting debts. 
Overall, non-violent attacks were motivated by financial gain (37–81%), more often by 
greed than debt. Revenge, a means of restoring equity, was a stronger motivator in violent 
(89%) and non-violent attacks (23–84%). 
For violent attacks, there is no data on how often supervisors noted CWBs or how 
often co-workers perceived the insider as disgruntled. For non-violent attacks, a broad 
range of CWBs (27–97%) had been observed. Co-workers perceived 19–57% of the 
insiders as disgruntled. Two reasons explain this: co-workers and supervisors perceive 
insider behavior differently. What some people find as concerning behavior, others might 
consider appropriate or as part of the insider’s unique personality. The second reason may 
be related to the timing of these questions. Employees interviewed after the attack may, in 
hindsight, identify behaviors as CWBs when they did not consider them as such 
beforehand.  
Behaviors are stronger indicators of a threat than criminal or psychiatric histories. 
The absence of a criminal history does not mean the insider will not commit an attack. The 
presence of a criminal history may be a concern for future illegal behavior.  
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V. FAIRFAX COUNTY AND RESCUE DEPARTMENT CASE 
STUDY: ACHIEVING PERCEIVED FAIRNESS 
The grievance response model is a descriptive, not predictive, model. The model 
may be used as a guide for organizations to identify what options employees may be more 
likely to use. The feasibility of the ELVC will differ by organization and employee. 
Organizations should be aware of this and encourage employees to use grievance response 
options and conflict management styles that result in positive outcomes for both the insider 
and the organization, such as voice as opposed to CWBs. Organizations should consider 
the following questions: 
• Is exit a viable option for employees experiencing a perceived injustice?  
• Can employees easily exit and maintain a similar status, pay, 
retirement, and benefits package?  
• Is loyalty rewarded?  
• Are systems in place for employees to voice grievances?  
• How many are there?  
• How well known are they to supervisors and employees? How 
accessible are they?  
• Is there an option to involve a neutral third party?  
• Are there perceived repercussions for voicing grievances?  
• Are CWBs tolerated?  
The FCFRD case study demonstrates how organizations can use information from 
the literature review, grievance response model, and lessons learned from the data analysis 
to prevent insider attacks. First, the researcher describes the culture of FCFRD as it relates 
to the feasibility of ELVC. Next, the researcher reviews the Fairfax County government 
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grievance procedures and their application within FCFRD. Then, the study explains the 
ADR system and its usage. Then the researcher compares FCFRD procedures to USMC 
procedures because the organizations have similar cultures. Finally, the researcher presents 
recommendations for FCFRD policy changes.  
A. EXIT 
FCFRD is located in Fairfax County, Virginia, and employs approximately 1,400 
uniformed personnel and 180 civilian personnel.153 Its culture and rank structure is similar 
to the military. The cost of exit is high due to hiring procedures, pay, and retirement. New 
hires can only enter at the rank of recruit firefighter, assistant fire chief, or fire chief. All 
other positions within the department require candidates to hold the previous rank at the 
time of application. Figure 22 shows the rank structure. Lieutenants are small-unit leaders 
of specialized apparatus; not every firefighter operates under a lieutenant’s command. All 
firefighters are under a captain’s command. 
                                                 
153 “Organizational Information,” Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department, accessed October 13, 
2018, https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/fire-ems/organizational-information.  
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Figure 22. FCFRD Rank Structure 
All employees, except assistant fire chief and fire chief, must complete FCFRD’s 
24–26-week recruit academy regardless of their previous certifications (a common practice 
in the fire service). Certifications can vary from state to state and departments want to train 
personnel on their own specific operational and administrative standards, policies, 
procedures, cultures, values, missions, and visions. FCFRD is the largest fire department 
in the northern Virginia region. The median salaries for firefighters ($73,179) and front-
line supervisors ($88,174) are higher than the state medians ($50,160 and $81,520, 
respectively).154 Firefighters exiting FCFRD will most likely experience a pay cut; 
supervisors who exit will experience dramatic pay cuts if they have to start over as a recruit 
firefighter.  
                                                 
154 “Fairfax County Career Pages: Firefighter/EMT,” Government Jobs, accessed October 14, 2018, 
https://www.governmentjobs.com/careers/fairfaxcounty/jobs/1945898/firefighter-emt; “Fairfax County 
Career Pages: Fire Lieutenant,” Government Jobs, accessed October 14, 2018, 
https://www.governmentjobs.com/careers/fairfaxcounty/classspecs?keywords=fire%20lieutenant; Andy 
Kiersz, “How Much Firefighters Are Paid in Every US State,” Business Insider, last modified July 30, 
2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/firefighter-salary-every-us-state-2018-5. 
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Fairfax County has a retirement system that is not transferable to the Virginia 
Retirement System used by other localities. Employees must consider the implications of 
having to start over in a different retirement system. An employee who is considering exit 
must decide whether they are willing to lose their rank, tenure, pay, benefits, and retirement 
by starting over in another department as a recruit firefighter. Exit may require relocation 
and attending another physically and mentally challenging recruit academy. The cost of 
exit is higher in FCFRD than it is in other county agencies that do not have these unique 
constraints. 
B. LOYALTY 
Employees who perceived injustice can choose to remain loyal and retain their rank, 
pay, tenure, and possible future promotions. The Public Safety Uniformed Retirement 
System rewards loyalty through increased benefits based on service time. Fairfax County 
government rewards loyalty, measured by service time, with increased sick and annual 
leave accumulations after three and 15 years of service.155 FCFRD issues length-of-service 
awards based on time in service.156 Promotions can be viewed as a reward for loyalty 
because all ranks, except assistant chiefs and the fire chief, require time in service. The 
only way to get promoted is to maintain a record free of major offenses, meet the service 
time requirements of the position, and score high on examinations. If the employee cannot 
forgive the perceived injustice, they may become frustrated and eventually engage in 
CWBs. Loyalty does not rectify perceived injustices. If the injustice affects more than one 
employee, then remaining loyal does not correct the problem for other employees and the 
organization.  
C. VOICE 
Within the Fairfax County government, employees have multiple avenues for 
addressing grievances via the voice response mechanism. The appropriateness of the 
                                                 
155 County of Fairfax, Leave, Personnel Regulations Chapter 10 (Fairfax, VA; Human Resources, 
December 5, 2017), 10-3, https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/hr/sites/hr/files/assets/documents/hr/chap10.pdf. 
156 County of Fairfax, 10-20. 
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avenue depends on the type of grievance. The avenues are employee groups, the Office for 
Human Rights and Equity Programs, the Office for ADR, and the county’s grievance 
procedure that involves the employee’s department, Fairfax County Human Resources 
(HR), and the Civil Service Commission.157 Avenues appropriate for each type of 
grievance are shown in Figure 23. 
                                                 
157 “Quick Guide to Fairfax County Employee Resources,” Fairfax County Government, accessed 




Figure 23. Quick Guide to Fairfax County Employee Resources.158 
The goal of the grievance process “is to provide a fair, detailed process whereby 
employees may voice complaints concerning issues related to their employment experience 
and/or circumstance with the County. The objective is to improve employee-management 
                                                 
158 Source: Fairfax County Government.  
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relations through a prompt and fair method of resolving problems.”159 Complaints fall into 
one of three categories:  
1. grievable, with a binding decision from a hearing panel of the Civil 
Service Commission 
2. nongrievable but eligible for a hearing and an advisory decision from a 
hearing officer appointed by the chair of the Civil Service Commission 
3. nongrievable with no hearing.160 
The grievance steps are outlined in Figure 24. 
                                                 
159 County of Fairfax, Grievance Procedures, Personnel Regulations Chapter 17 (Fairfax, VA; 
Human Resources, December 5, 2017), https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/hr/sites/hr/files/assests/files/
documents/hr/chap17.pdf, 17-1. 
160 County of Fairfax, Grievance Procedures, Personnel Regulations Chapter 17 (Fairfax, VA; 




Figure 24. FCFRD Grievance Steps based on Fairfax County Government Personnel Regulations Chapter 17.161 
                                                 
161 Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department, Grievances, Standard Operating Procedure 02.07.01 (Fairfax, VA: Fairfax County Fire and Rescue 
Department, 2018), https://firenet/ffire/docs/sops/pdf/02.07.01.sop.pdf. 
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The grievance procedures are consistent and transparent to all employees. The 
process is straightforward and offers employees opportunities for appeals. However, 
FCFRD’s application of the process may create a perception of unfairness. Historically, 
FCFRD immediate supervisors (lieutenants, captains) do not interact directly with FCFRD 
HR. Those interactions usually occur at the deputy, assistant, and fire chief levels. The lack 
of interaction at lower supervisory levels may be due to the limited number of HR 
personnel compared to the number of FCFRD immediate supervisors.  
The unwritten FCFRD process is when the lieutenant or captain informs their 
supervisor of the recommendation for discipline. Discipline ascends through the chain of 
command to the assistant chief. The assistant chief consults HR on unique situations or 
situations warranting severe discipline. The deputy fire chief reviews and approves, 
modifies, or denies informal warnings. Assistant fire chiefs approve formal warnings. The 
decision is passed back down through the chain of command for the immediate supervisor 
to administer. If the employee decides to grieve the decision, the same people who 
approved the discipline adjudicate the first two steps. Grievances, like discipline, also 
ascend through the chain of command. The assistant chief issues the decision and returns 
it for the immediate supervisor (step one) or the deputy chief (step two) to administer. By 
step two, the chain of command has already reviewed the situation three times if it was 
related to discipline and twice if discipline was not involved.  
An alternative to the grievance system is the ADR program. ADR’s vision is to 
create “a community in Fairfax County Government where all workplace cultures are 
conflict competent and employees are encouraged to learn through collaborative problem 
solving skills.”162 Fairfax County government’s ADR program is an integrated conflict 
management system. Integrated conflict management systems use “a systematic approach 
                                                 
162 “ADR Homepage,” Fairfax County Government, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http;//fairfaxnet.fairfaxcounty.gov/Dept/CSC/Pages/ADR-Home-Page.aspx. 
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to preventing, managing, and resolving conflict that focuses on the causes of conflict within 
the organization.”163 Organizations that have integrated conflict management systems:  
• encourage all personnel to use the voice option early 
• incorporate collaborative problem-solving with the organization’s culture  
• encourage direct negotiation between personnel experiencing conflict 
• align conflict management mechanisms with each other and the 
organization’s mission, vision, and values 
• ensure everyone understands the mechanisms available 
• establishes mechanisms that are flexible and user-friendly164 
ADR provides neutral third parties for dispute management, collaborative and 
respectful techniques to address conflicts, and a safe and confidential environment. Five 
mechanisms are used to provide these services: consultation, mediation, conflict coaching, 
restorative process, and facilitated dialogue.165 Consultations consist of conversations with 
ADR staff to create strategies to manage conflict.166 Mediation is a formal, confidential 
process for resolving disputes with the support of neutral third parties. Mediators guide 
participants to find resolutions. ADR describes the mediation process as non-linear and 
consisting of five phases: introductions, storytelling, identification of issues and needs, 
brainstorming solutions, and developing agreements.167 Mediators are county employees 
from various departments. ADR asks participants whether they prefer a mediator from their 
                                                 
163 Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, Designing Integrated Conflict Management 
Systems: Guidelines for Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell/PERC 
Institute on Conflict Resolution and Washington, DC: Association for Conflict Resolution, 2001), 
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=icrpubs, 8. 
164 Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 8. 
165 Fairfax County Government, “ADR Homepage.” 
166 “Consultations,” Fairfax County Government, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http;//fairfaxnet.fairfaxcounty.gov/Dept/CSC/Pages/ADR-Consultations.aspx. 
167 “Mediation,” Fairfax County Government, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http;//fairfaxnet.fairfaxcounty.gov/Dept/CSC/Pages/ADR-Mediation.aspx. 
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department or not. Some employees feel their department’s culture is unique and prefer 
someone who is familiar with its dynamics and some feel mediators from within the 
department could remain neutral because the employee may feel they have a negative 
reputation within their department.  
ADR defines conflict coaching as “a one-on-one relationship with a trained conflict 
coach, who provides support and conflict resolution tools for Fairfax County employees to 
help navigate their conflicts in the workplace.”168 Participants in a dispute go through an 
intake process to determine their situation and needs. A conflict coach is then assigned. 
Fairfax County government employees volunteer to be conflict coaches since there are only 
two full-time ADR staff. Conflict coaches and mediators attend multi-day formal training 
conducted by ADR staff, which involves both lecture and role plays. After successfully 
completing the specific training courses, conflict coaches and mediators are assigned cases. 
ADR staff members follow up with all parties on a regular basis to ensure the employee’s 
needs are being met. The resulting restorative processes are an opportunity for co-workers 
to discuss events that have caused workplace tension in order to improve relationships and 
the work environment.169 Facilitated dialogues involve a neutral third-party assisting 
employees with potentially contentious meetings or conversations.170 
ADR also provides employee training with the goal of fostering “conflict 
competencies for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts.”171 ADR achieves this 
through courses in conflict resolution, communication, teamwork, dealing with challenging 
people, conflict styles, active listening, mindfulness and constructive choice, and 
personality styles (such as Meyers-Brigg Type Indicator). Courses are offered regularly to 
                                                 
168 “Conflict Coaching,” Fairfax County Government, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http;//fairfaxnet.fairfaxcounty.gov/Dept/CSC/Pages/ADR-Conflict-Coaching.aspx. 
169 “Restorative Processes,” Fairfax County Government, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http;//fairfaxnet.fairfaxcounty.gov/Dept/CSC/Pages/ADR-Restorative-Processes.aspx. 
170 “Facilitated Dialogues,” Fairfax County Government, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http;//fairfaxnet.fairfaxcounty.gov/Dept/CSC/Pages/ADR-Facilitated-Dialogues.aspx. 
171 ÁDR Home Page, Fairfax County Government, accessed on October 14, 2018, 
http;//fairfaxnet.fairfaxcounty.gov/Dept/CSC/Pages/ADR-Conflict-Coaching.aspx 
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all employees or can be tailored to fit the needs of specific workgroups.172 In FY2015, 
1,427 employees participated in at least one aspect of the ADR program; in FY 2017, the 
number rose to 2,134. In FY2017, 16.2% of employees participated in the conflict 
management process, in FY2015 only 10.6% did. The percentage of participants satisfied 
with ADR services in FY2017 was 96% as opposed to 91% in FY2015. ADR is being used 
more frequently with improved satisfaction among employees.173 ADR usage and training 
from FY2016 to FY2018 is shown in Figure 25. The number of sessions varies for each 
case. 
                                                 
172 “Trainings and Workshops,” Fairfax County Government, accessed October 14, 2018, 
http;//fairfaxnet.fairfaxcounty.gov/Dept/CSC/Pages/ADR-Training_and_Workshops.aspx. 
173 Fairfax County Department of Management and Budget, Fairfax County, Virginia FY 2019 






Figure 25. Fairfax County Government ADR Services and Trainings from 
FY2016 to FY2018174 
                                                 
174 Kristen Woodward, email message to author, October 30, 2018. 
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D. COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIORS 
CWBs are an option for any employee experiencing a perceived injustice, but they 
have consequences. FCFRD adheres to the rules of conduct and discipline established by 
the Fairfax County government. Discipline is progressive and consists of three steps: 
informal warnings (oral warnings), formal warnings (written reprimands), and formal 
disciplinary actions (suspensions, dismissals, and disciplinary demotions).175 Discipline 
depends on the severity of the offense and the employee’s work record. Although all should 
abide by the same standard, supervisors are responsible for monitoring employee behavior 
and initiating discipline if warranted. Co-workers are responsible for notifying a supervisor 
about concerning behaviors. Discipline is not the only option; FCFRD has Employee 
Assistance Programs available to employees voluntarily or through supervisory referral. 
FCFRD also has an in-house Behavioral Health section staffed by trained civilian and 
uniformed personnel. It also has a peer-support team composed of fire department 
personnel trained in active listening skills, crisis intervention, and suicide awareness. In 
2017, the Behavioral Health section with the assistance of ADR created a peer-mediator 
team to increase the number of trained fire department personnel. Peer mediators teach 
conflict competence and provide formal and informal mediations within the FCFRD.  
E. UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AND EXIT, LOYALTY, VOICE, 
AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK BEHAVIORS 
Military members face many of the same influences as FCFRD personnel when 
deciding how to respond to perceived workplace injustices using ELVC options. Military 
members can exit via the Department of Defense established the “Inter-Service and Inter-
Component Transfers of Service Members,” which requires approval of both the service 
they are leaving and the service they are joining as well as completion of their service 
                                                 
175 Fairfax County Government, Conduct and Discipline, Personnel Regulations Chapter 16 (Fairfax, 
VA; Human Resources, July 25, 2017), 
https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/hr/sites/hr/files/assets/documents/hr/chap16.pdf, 16-1. 
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commitment.176 Loyalty has similar advantages as FCFRD: rank, pay, tenure, and possible 
future promotions.  
USMC has three voice mechanisms for expressing grievances for non-judicial 
complaints: Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO), Inspector General (IG), or the chain 
of command. EEO investigates complaints involving hazing, sexual harassment, and 
discrimination. Grievances can be reported directly to the IG for matters involving the 
following: abuse of power; inappropriate gifts (giving or receiving); conflicts of interest; 
ethics violations; fraud; false official statements/claims; political activities; misuse of time, 
government property, position, or public office; whistleblower protection; significant cases 
of mismanagement and time and attendance violations, and systemic problems.177 Unlike 
FCFRD, military officers’ authority to issue discipline comes with rank; the severity of 
discipline increases with an officer’s rank.178 FCFRD approval of discipline begins at the 
deputy fire chief level. 
USMC personnel may also Request Mast. Request Mast is “the right of all Marines 
to directly seek assistance from, or communicate grievances to their commanding 
officers.”179 The process allows personnel to communicate directly with any commanding 
officer in the chain of command including the commander general. The commander is 
required to consider the issue and personally respond to the requestor.180 Commanding 
officers can deny requests, but they should provide an explanation and further resources 
and procedures for resolution. Request Mast shall not be used for discipline arising from 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice or to “harass, avoid duty, or intentionally interfere 
                                                 
176 Department of Defense, Inter-Service and Inter-Component Transfers of Service Members, DoD 
Instruction 1300.24 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, July 25, 2017), 
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130004_dodi_2017.pdf, 3. 
177 “Inspector General of the Marine Corps,” The United States Marine Corps, accessed October 14, 
2018, https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/igmc/Resources/Submit-a-Complaint-/. 
178 Department of Defense, Commanding Officer’s Non-Judicial Punishment, Uniformed Code of 
Military Justice Article 15 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1951), http://www.ucmj.us/sub-
chapter-3-non-judicial-punishment/815-article-15-commanding-officers-non-judicial-punishment. 
179 Department of the Navy, Request Mast Procedures, NAVMC Directive 1700.23F (Washington, 
DC: Department of the Navy, March 22, 2007), 1 
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/NAVMC%20DIR%201700.23F.pdf. 
180 Department of the Navy, Request Mast Procedures. 
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with the Commanding Officer’s ability to carry out the functions and missions of the 
command.”181 FCFRD can receive waivers to skip the first and second steps of the 
grievance process for suspensions, demotions, and terminations. Military and FCFRD 
personnel must justify why they are requesting to skip levels in the chain of command. 
Both the military and FCFRD have policies in place to protect grievance filers from 
retaliation. However, service members and FCFRD employees may have concerns over the 
unspoken ramifications such as retaliation. 
F. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis provides three recommendations for improvement within FCFRD: a 
change in the supervisory levels that approve discipline, a change in the supervisory levels 
that adjudicate grievances, and increased efforts to use ADR. Fairfax County’s ADR 
system has the four features identified with higher perceptions of procedural justice in the 
literature review: its credibility, employee input, it’s well-known, and the inclusion of 
neutral third parties. Within FCFRD’s formal grievance system, the perception of 
unfairness exists because the same chain of command that issues discipline hears the 
grievance. If the issuing officer’s supervisor did not think the discipline was appropriate, 
they would not have approved it initially.  
The grievance system does allow the employee to present their perspective; 
however, the chain of command has already heard and agreed with the supervisor’s 
narrative. How much weight does this have on distributive outcomes? Since 2014, no 
employees received relief in step one (adjudicated by the immediate supervisor who issued 
the discipline). Only two out of 73 grievances received any form of relief in step two (the 
deputy fire chief). As anticipated, any form of relief granted usually occurs at step three—
most often the first level of the grievance process in which the decision maker (fire chief) 
was not involved in the initial discipline approval process. The exception is discipline 
involving deputy fire chiefs. The first discipline would come from an assistant fire chief 
and their supervisor (the fire chief) would adjudicate the second step.  
                                                 
181 “Inspector General of the Marine Corps,” The United States Marine Corps, accessed October 14, 
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When the employee files a step one and step two grievance, the supervisor 
adjudicating the grievance has five business days to meet with the employee and an 
additional five business days to respond. Employees can grant extensions if the supervisor 
requests them. By the time the step-two grievance process is complete, the employee has 
been experiencing the perceived injustice for at least 20 business days. According to 
FCFRD grievance data, 99.99% of employees who filed step-two grievances in 2014–2017 
perceived a workplace injustice, voiced this grievance in step one, and received no relief. 
During this time, they most likely talked about the situation with co-workers and possibly 
experienced decreased productivity and morale. When the fire chief adjudicated the third 
step, 0.2% received some form of relief. Of the employees who went to Civil Service, a 




Figure 26. FCFRD Grievance Data 2014–2017182 
                                                 
182 Jay Grove, email message to author, October 17, 2018. 
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The chiefs may have upheld the grievances for lack of merit, not because the system 
is unfair; however, the perception of unfairness is worth considering. In this vein, how can 
FCFRD increase perceptions of fairness, transparency, and trust related to discipline and 
grievance procedures? Julie Olson-Buchanan and Wendy Boswell found higher 
perceptions of procedural justice associated with ODR systems that are consistent, credible, 
transparent, well-known, allow for appeals, and involve neutral third parties.183 FCFRD 
should consider adopting an approach similar to the military in regard to issuing discipline. 
Immediate supervisors (captains) should be able to propose informal warnings. Battalion 
chiefs should be empowered and trusted to approve the discipline as a mentoring function 
for captains. Informal warnings should not need to go any further up the chain of command 
due to the low-level nature of the offense. Deputy chiefs should be able to approve formal 
warnings in consultation with HR for consistency. Formal disciplinary actions are the most 
severe form of discipline. Proposals for formal disciplinary actions should go up through 
the chain of command for the three assistant chiefs to review together. If they agree on the 
formal discipline, then it should proceed to the fire chief for final approval because of the 
proposed severity of the offense. See Table 3. All supervisors should consult with HR to 
ensure consistency. HR should maintain a discipline database to meet this proposed model.  
Table 3. Discipline within the FCFRD 
Type of Discipline Current System Proposed System 
Informal warnings issued by Captain Captain 
Informal warnings approved by Assistant Chief Battalion Chief 
Formal warnings issued by Captain Captain 
Formal warnings approved by Assistant Chief Deputy Chief in 
consultation with HR 
Formal disciplinary actions issued by Fire Chief Fire Chief 
Formal disciplinary actions approved by Fire Chief Fire Chief with 
recommendations 
from Assistant Chiefs 
 
                                                 
183 Olson-Buchanan and Boswell, “Organizational Dispute Resolution Systems,” 334-337. 
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The ranks adjudicating grievances should be adjusted (Figure 27). Step one 
grievances should be heard and decided by a battalion chief. The battalion chief has not 
heard the employee’s perspective; whereas, the immediate supervisor should have asked 
the employee during the investigation and prior to issuing discipline. Step two grievances 
should still be heard and decided on by a deputy chief. The fire chief would still hear step 
three grievances.  
 
Figure 27. Proposed FCFRD Grievance Process 
FCFRD should continue working to increase awareness of ADR services and 
access. In 2017, FCFRD added modules on ADR to mandatory initial certification classes 
for all lieutenants (Fire Officer I and II). ADR staff is assisting with the lectures and role 
play scenarios based on actual events in the FCFRD. Ongoing mandatory officer training 
sessions for all officers have also included ADR staff and material. The officers then train 
their subordinates and offer ADR services during counseling sessions. The peer mediator 
program is another low-cost way of informing FCFRD personnel without sending them to 
formal training. ADR information is available on the Fairfax County government intranet 
to all employees. The results of these actions are an increased number of FCFRD intakes 
to ADR as well as mediation and conflict coaching sessions (Figure 28). 
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Figure 28. FCFRD ADR Usage from FY2016 to FY2018184 
FCFRD has a good grievance response system that can prevent disgruntled 
employees from committing attacks, but there is room for improvement. FCFRD should 
acknowledge the cost of exit influences employee responses to perceived injustice in the 
workplace. There are no specific recommendations to lower the cost of exit. The 
organization should recognize because the cost of exit is high, employees are more likely 
to use one of the other three options. FCFRD could research whether there are more 
opportunities to make loyalty more appealing. Increasing loyalty may not be a high priority 
for grievance reduction as there are multiple incentives already in place. Opportunities to 
increase loyalty may have an additional benefit of increasing job satisfaction.  
FCFRD should improve its response to voice by adjusting what levels in the chain 
of command issue different types of discipline and adjudicate grievances. Having 
supervisors adjudicate grievances related to discipline or issues they were not involved in 
increases perceptions of fairness. Ongoing employee ADR education should continue, and 
                                                 
184 Kristen Woodward, email message to author, October 30, 2018. 
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employees should be educated about the specific options and process when filing formal 
grievances. Employees who perceive grievance systems as fair are more likely to use voice 
and have an increased perception of procedural justice. FCFRD should continue to look 




VI. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis answers three questions: 
1. How do employees respond to perceived workplace injustices? 
2. What is the relationship between employee responses to perceived 
workplace injustices and insider attacks? 
3. How can organizations prevent disgruntled employees from committing 
attacks?  
ELVC is a descriptive, not predictive, theory that states employees respond to 
perceived workplace injustices in one, or a combination of, four ways: exit, loyalty, voice, 
and CWBs. Exit is when the employee voluntarily leaves the situation, loyalty is when the 
employee chooses no other response, voice is when the employee attempts to change rather 
than escape an unjust situation, and CWBs are active or passive attempts to restore equity 
using actions resulting in harm to co-workers or the organization. The grievance response 
model illustrates the process of how an event becomes a grievance, the influences that 
affect the process, and how an employee may respond. 
Be aware of employee responses to perceived injustice and how the 
organization can shape those responses. Organizations should be aware of ELVC and 
positive and negative influences on specific responses to perceived workplace injustices. 
They should apply it to their organizations to identify how employees are more likely to 
respond. Organizations should take actions to guide employees toward positive responses 
and hold them accountable for negative responses; however, organizations should not hold 
on to poorly performing employees and employees should not stay in environments they 
perceived to be unjust if loyalty and voice do not work. Supervisors should talk to 
employees about how conflict affects them, their perceived options, and the repercussions 
or potential outcome of each option. How does the employee feel about the situation? What 
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do they want to do about it? What will happen if they do that? What might a better option 
be? Supervisors then have the opportunity to discuss positive alternatives and document 
employee responses.  
The relationship between employee responses to perceived workplace injustices 
and insider attacks could not be determined because the data needed was not publicly 
available. However, the available data provided valuable information. The definition of an 
insider must include former employees regardless of whether their separation was 
voluntary or not. The most common grievance was related to mistreatment followed by 
performance issues, and revenge was a strong motivation for attacks.  
Remember, a separated employee must be completely separated. Organizations 
should immediately revoke physical and cyber access for all employees when they separate 
voluntarily or involuntarily. Organizations should not ignore employees who perceive they 
are victims of workplace injustice. These employees should be a starting point for insider 
threat monitoring. Supervisors and co-workers should recognize and report CWBs. 
Employees engaging in CWBs should be held accountable.  
Bring employees and supervisors up to speed on how best to handle workplace 
justice. In addition to the preceding recommendations, organizations should educate and 
train employees and supervisors. They should change or create policies, procedures, and 
cultures that incorporate these recommendations. They should ensure ADR systems are 
credible, allow for employee input, are well-known, and involve neutral third parties. 
People have varying conflict management styles; therefore, having various grievance 
methods available increases the probability employees will use and perceive the voice 
response as fair. Organizations must recognize their influence on employee responses to 
perceived workplace injustices and ability to prevent insider attacks. These 
recommendations may not only prevent future attacks but also improve employee 
relationships within their organizations. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
A critical research limitation is a lack of three types of data: narrative, behavioral, 
and data from organizations. Relevant data from organizations may not exist, be available, 
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or be free of bias or error. Data may be hard to find because attackers conceal their behavior 
or organizations do not preserve or share data due to confidentiality concerns. 
Confidentiality is a necessity for employees and organizations but an obstacle for research. 
Organizations may be unwilling to share data due to concerns about image, criminal and 
civil liability, or fear of broadcasting security issues that may lead to future attacks, 
especially if the organization did not correct issues that led to attacks. Therefore, this 
research relied solely on publicly available data and a comprehensive literature review to 
provide recommendations.  
There are multiple, contradictory, and missing narratives. Most attack information 
was based solely on media and contradictory third-party reports; over half of the insiders 
who committed violence inside died and were unable to provide their narrative. Therefore, 
the third parties and the researcher speculated about the root and proximate causes of the 
insider’s grievances and behavior.  
When dealing with human behavior, direct cause-and-effect relationships are 
difficult to prove, and correlation does not necessarily equal causation. Individual, 
situation, organizational, and other unknown factors have unpredictable influences. No 
situation is the same, and no two people react the same way. These three limitations are 
part of why insider threats are a wicked problem.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are three areas where future research would benefit the insider threat field: 
the creation of a type III workplace violence fatality database, ELVC responses and 
influences, and ADR effectiveness measuring. The National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, headquartered at the University of Maryland, 
maintains the Global Terrorism Database. The database exists “in an effort to increase 
understanding of terrorist violence so that it can be more readily studied and defeated.”185 
It uses open-source information about the date and location of the attack, the weapons used, 
the target, the number of casualties, and responsible group or individual.  
                                                 
185 “Overview of the GTD,” Global Terrorism Database, accessed January 17, 2019, 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/. 
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Insider threat and workplace violence research would benefit from a similar 
database. In order to narrow the focus and obtain as much open-source data as possible, 
the database could be limited to events that result in fatalities. Data points could include 
the date, location, insider, age, gender, employment status at the time of the attack, whether 
the insider survived the attack, motivation, target, organization award of perceived 
injustice, CWBs displayed, and presence of criminal or psychiatric history. All of the data 
may be difficult to collect for reasons noted in the limitations, but a desire for complete 
data should not be a reason for no data. 
ELVC theory should continue to be studied to identify other possible responses and 
influences on response choices from psychological, sociological, organizational 
leadership, and justice perspectives. Organizations would benefit by understanding 
influences and barriers to positive responses to perceived workplace injustice so they can 
change policies, procedures, and culture.  
ADR effectiveness should be measured generically and organizationally. 
Measuring ADR effectiveness substantiates policies and procedures in place and allows 
for improvement. Quantitative numbers such as how many employees use ADR do not 
indicate effectiveness. Low numbers of use may indicate low numbers of disputes or low 
system credibility. Instead, surveys may be an option. Organizations should give exit 
surveys to employees who resign before retirement asking why they left. If they left 
because of perceived injustices, organizations should ask what steps they took to resolve 
the conflict, why, and the perceived outcome. Climate surveys can be given to the 
organization to understand employee’s perceptions of the culture in regards to grievances. 
Grievance response surveys can be given to employees to determine which ELVC response 
they would use in workplace situations and why.  
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF VIOLENT INSIDER ATTACKS FROM ORIGINAL DATA COLLECTED 





3/20/2000 Irving  Texas Fired 1 day No Both No Yes Performance 
5/24/2000 New York New York Fired few months No Both Yes Yes Performance 
12/26/2000 Wakefield Massachusetts Active   No Both No No Financial 
2/5/2001 Melrose Park Illinois Fired 7 years Suicide Organization No Yes Performance 
7/13/2001 Palm Beach Gardens Florida Active   No Individual Yes No Mistreated 
12/6/2001 Goshen Indiana Active   Suicide Both Yes No Performance 
3/22/2002 South Bend Indiana Active   Suicide Both No No Performance 
6/8/2002 Providence Rhode Island Active   Suicide Individual No No Mistreated 
7/1/2003 Jefferson City Missouri Active   Suicide Both No No  Performance 
7/8/2003 Meridian Mississippi Active   Suicide Both No No Performance 
7/9/2003 San Angelo Texas Active   Suicide Individual Yes No Performance 
7/25/2003 Huntsville Alabama Fired same day No Individual No No Performance 
8/27/2003 Chicago Illinois Fired 6 months 
Killed by 
police Both No Yes Performance 
11/6/2003 Atlanta Georgia Resigned 2 years No Organization Yes No Mistreated 
7/2/2004 Kansas City  Kansas Active   Suicide Individual No No Mistreated 
1/26/2005 Toledo Ohio Active   Suicide Individual Yes No Performance 
2/18/2005 Romulus Michigan Fired same day No Individual No No Performance 
2/21/2005 Pascagoula Mississippi Active   No Individual No No Mistreated 
2/25/2005 Los Angeles California Active   No Individual No No Performance 
5/5/2005 Houston Texas Active   Suicide Individual No No Financial 
5/9/2005 San Francisco California Fired 8 months No Individual Yes Yes Mistreated 
9/15/2005 Oak Lawn Illinois Active   No Individual No No Mistreated 
9/27/2005 New Windsor New York Fired 1 year Suicide Both No Yes Performance 
11/23/2005 Glen Burnie Maryland Fired same day Suicide Individual No No Performance 
1/30/2006 Goleta California Retired 3 years Suicide Organization Yes Yes Mistreated 
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4/4/2006 Baker City Oregon Active   No Individual No No Mistreated 
4/18/2006 St. Louis  Missouri Fired 1 day Suicide Individual No No Financial 
6/25/2006 Denver Colorado Active   
Killed by 
police Organization No No Mistreated 
3/5/2007 Signal Hill  California Active   Suicide Individual No No Financial 
4/9/2007 Troy Michigan Fired 4 days No Individual Yes No Performance 
4/20/2007 Houston Texas Active   Suicide Individual No No Performance 
8/8/2007 Perrysburg Ohio Active   No Individual Yes No Performance 
8/30/2007 Bronx New York Fired 2 years No Individual No No Performance 
9/10/2007 Sheboygan Michigan Resigned  11 months Suicide Individual No No Mistreated 
3/18/2008 Santa Maria California Active   No Individual Yes No Mistreated 
4/1/2008 Randolph Massachusetts Active   Suicide Individual Yes No Mistreated 
4/30/2008 Chicago Illinois Active   No Individual No No Mistreated 
6/25/2008 Henderson Kentucky Active   Suicide Both No No Performance 
8/1/2008 Bristol Pennsylvania Fired 4 months No Individual No Yes Financial 
10/13/2008 San Antonio Texas Active   No Individual No No Mistreated 
11/14/2008 Silicon Valley California Fired same day No Individual Yes No Performance 
12/8/2008 Austin Texas Fired 2 days Suicide Individual No No Mistreated 
12/30/2008 Nederland Colorado Active   Suicide Individual Yes No Mistreated 
1/29/2009 Cambridge  Massachusetts Active   No Individual No No Mistreated 
2/14/2009 Brockport New York Fired 1 day  No Individual Yes No Mistreated 
3/24/2009 San Diego California Active   
Killed by 
police Organization No No Performance 
11/5/2009 Fort Hood Texas Active   No Organization No No Mistreated 
11/6/2009 Orlando Florida Fired 2 years No Organization Yes No Financial 
12/23/2009 Baton Rogue Louisiana Fired 
several 
months No Both Yes No Financial 
1/7/2010 St. Louis  Missouri Active   Suicide Organization No No Mistreated 
1/12/2010 Kennesaw George Fired 1 year No Organization Yes No Mistreated 
2/12/2010 Huntsville Alabama Active   No Both Yes No Performance 
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3/10/2010 Columbus  Ohio Active   Suicide Individual No Yes Performance 
3/20/2010 Tarpon Springs Florida Active   No Individual No No Mistreated 
5/17/2010 Boulder Colorado Active   Suicide Individual No No Financial 
8/3/2010 Manchester Connecticut Fired same day Suicide Both No No Mistreated 
9/9/2010 Philadelphia Pennsylvania Active   No Individual Yes No Performance 
9/22/2010 Crete Nebraska Active   Suicide Individual No No Mistreated 
10/5/2011 Cupertino California Active   Suicide Both No No Mistreated 
12/16/2011 Irwindale California Active   Suicide Individual No No Performance 
1/13/2012 Star North Carolina Active   Suicide Individual Yes No Mistreated 
2/26/2012 Long Beach California Active   
Killed by 
police Individual No No Performance 
8/24/2012 New York New York Fired 1 year 
Killed by 
police Individual No No Mistreated 
8/31/2012 Old Bridge Township New Jersey Active   Suicide Organization Yes No Mistreated 
9/27/2012 Minneapolis Minnesota Fired same day Suicide Organization Yes Yes Performance 
11/6/2012 Fresno California Active   Suicide Individual Yes Yes Mistreated 
2/7/2013 Multiple California Fired 5 years Suicide Both No No Performance 
6/13/2013 St. Louis  Missouri Active   Suicide Individual No No Mistreated 
8/24/2013 Lake Butler Florida Active   Suicide Individual No No Performance 
9/16/2013 Washington DC Active   
Killed by 
police Organization Yes Yes Mistreated 
4/2/2014 Fort Hood Texas Active   Suicide Organization Yes Yes Mistreated 
4/29/2014 Kennesaw Georgia Active   Suicide Organization Yes No Mistreated 
7/31/205 Chicago Illinois Active   Suicide Individual No No Performance 
9/23/2015 Hoover  Alabama Fired 1 day No Individual No No Performance 
9/23/2014 Birmingham Alabama Fired 1 month Suicide Individual No No Performance 
9/24/2014 Moore Oklahoma Fired same day No Organization No Yes Performance 
2/12/2015 Sioux Falls  South Dakota Active   Suicide Individual Yes No Mistreated 
7/16/2015 Chattanooga Tennessee Active   
Killed by 
police Organization Yes No Mistreated 
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8/26/2015 Roanoke Virginia Fired 2 years Suicide Individual No No Mistreated 
12/2/2015 San Bernardino California Active   
Killed by 
police Both No No Mistreated 
2/25/2016 Hesston Kansas Active   
Killed by 
police both Yes Yes Mistreated 
5/4/2016 Katy Texas Fired 2 weeks Suicide Individual No No Mistreated 
10/25/2016 Roanoke Virginia Fired 7 months Suicide Organization No No Performance 
11/28/2016 Palmview Texas Active   No Organization Yes No Mistreated 
6/5/2017 Orlando Florida Fired 2 months Suicide Individual No Yes Mistreated 
6/8/2017 Eaton Township Pennsylvania Active   Suicide Individual Yes No Mistreated 
6/14/2017 San Francisco California Active   Suicide Organization No Yes Mistreated 
10/16/2017 Taylor Michigan Fired 3 months No Individual Yes Yes Mistreated 
10/18/2017 Edgewood Maryland Active   No Individual No Yes Mistreated 
10/5/2017 New York New York Fired 2 days Suicide Individual No Yes Performance 
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APPENDIX B. WORKPLACE VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM 
DATA186 
Data Point Results (90 Cases Total) 
Employment Status at Time of Attack Employed  55 61% 
Not Employed 35 39% 
Terminated 32 91% 
Resigned 2 6% 
Retired 1 3% 
Time Since Employment Same Day 7 20% 
1 to 7 days  7 20% 
1 week to 1 month 2 6% 
1 to 6 months 6 17% 
6 to 12 months 5 14% 
2 to 7 years 5 14% 
Lived through the attack? Lived 34 38% 
Died 56 62% 
Killed by Police 9 16% 
Committed Suicide 47 84% 
Grievance Mistreatment 46 51% 
Performance 36 40% 
Debts 8 9% 
Target Individual 54 60% 
Organization 18 20% 
Both 18 20% 
Psychiatric/Intellectual Disability Yes 33 37% 
Criminal History Yes 20 22% 
 
  
                                                 
186 Data compiled from Appendix A. 
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APPENDIX C. INSIDER TERRORISM DATA187 
Data Point Results (3 Cases Total) 
Employment Status at Time of Attack Employed  2 67% 
Not Employed 1 33% 
Terminated 1 33% 
Resigned 0  
Retired 0  
T Time Since Employment Same Day 0  
1 to 7 days  0  
1 week to 1 month 0  
1 to 6 months 0  
6 to 12 months 0  
2 to 7 years 1 33% 
Lived through the attack? Lived 1 33% 
Died 2 67% 
Killed by Police 1 33% 
Committed Suicide 1 33% 
Grievance Mistreatment 2 67% 
Performance 1 33% 
Debts 0  
Target Individual 0  
Organization 1 33% 
Both 2 67% 
Psychiatric/Intellectual Disability Yes 0  
Criminal History Yes 0  
 
  
                                                 
187 Compiled from data in Appendix A.  
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APPENDIX D. COMPARISON BETWEEN VIOLENT INSIDER 
DATA AND LEE AND MCCRIE’S STUDY ON MASS WORKPLACE 
HOMICIDE COMMITTED BY EMPLOYEES188 
Data Point Thesis Lee and McCrie 
Number of Cases 90 44 
Employment Status at Time of 
Attack 
Employed  61% 55% 
Not Employed 39% 46% 
Terminated 91% 61% 
Resigned 6% Not Available 
Retired 3% Not Available 
Time Since Employment 
Same Day 20% 16% 
1 day to 1 month 26% 16% 
1 month to 1 year 
 
31% 75% 
2 to 7 years 14% None 
Lived through the attack? 
Grievance 
Lived 38% 46% 
Died 62% 54% 
Killed by Police 16% 7% 
Committed Suicide 84% 48% 
Grievance 
Mistreatment 51%  
Performance 40% 30% 
Debts 9%  
Target 
Individual 60% Supervisor 66% 
Organization 20%  
Both 20%  
Psychiatric Issues /Intellectual 
Disability 
Yes 37% 21% 
Criminal History Yes 22% 16% 
Motivation Revenge/Anger Unknown 89% 
 
                                                 
188 Grievance causes were counted twice if they were both present. Compiled from data in Appendix 
A; Adapted from Lee and McCrie, Mass Homicides by Employees in the American Workplace, 11-19. 
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APPENDIX E. COMPARISON OF NON-VIOLENT INSIDER 
ATTACK DATA FROM FOUR CERT STUDIES189 







# of cases and 
insiders 





Employed  41%  90% 53% 
Not Employed 59%  10% 47% 
Terminated 48%   37% 
Resigned 38%   41% 
Laid off 7%   7% 
Criminal 
History 
Yes 30% 27% 31% 38% 
Grievance Mistreatment  50%  10% 20% 
Performance  20%  40% 47% 
Motivation Debts / Greed  81% 51% 37% 
Revenge / Anger 84% 23% 24% 56% 
Address 
Grievance 
41%  14% 12% 




24% 15%  12% 
CWBs  Supervisor 
noticed? 
97% 27% 30% 30% 
Consequences 74%   70% 
Recorded 
discipline 
31%  84% 29% 
Perceived as 
disgruntled 
 57% 19% 21% 32% 
 
  
                                                 
189 Adapted from Keeney et al.; Randazzo et al.; Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore; Kowalski et al. 
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